vineri, 28 ianuarie 2011

The Regret - some nonlogical aspects -

Bernard Williams approaches the problem of logicifying the ethical issues. Especially, he considers the possibility of comparing the ethical state of two possible contradictory decisions to the logical contradiction. His choice is for admitting that ethical case differs from the logical one, because of the fact that preferring one decision, the subject does not escape from troubles, but continues suffering them. When he adopts one of the two possible decisions, the one he expelled still functions as regret in his conscience.
Following B. William’s suggestion, we should take account of the following aspects proper to regret:
a) as a nonlogical matter:
  • the regret cannot be spoken out loudly in an appropriate manner; moreover, it cannot be expressed by a logical or linguistic enunciation
  • the regret cannot be an object of logical operations; it cannot imply anything – the outer decisions justified by regret have in fact other causes; it has not a pair as in a biconditional relation – the event that caused feelings of regret is not its primary cause, but such a cause is rather the moral agent; it cannot be strongly conjoined with other feelings and it is not disjunctively a matter of substitution
b) as a different case from that of logical contradiction:
  • the regret cannot be measured by a temporary scale; it cannot decrease in time according to a definite schedule; it cannot receive a dead line due to a supposed end of a process of conscience
  • the regret accepts contradictory associated feelings; for instance, it does not preclude the interlace of joy with sorrow in the same moral agent; also, it does not lead to the breakdown of a moral agent as the logical contradiction does it in respect of a discourse
  • the regret cannot affect a definite area of conscience, while the logical contradiction can be pointed out by referring to a precise pair of propositions
  • the existence of feelings of regret cannot be explained by some definite circumstances; for instance, the abandon of a possible ethical decision cannot affect the subject only by itself, but also by a set of images, emotions suggested by the case