The preference for generality is also motivated by a folded desire to overcome an intimate relation with particulars.
Such an intimacy is to be refuted however it could be: positive or negative. Because, in spite of the classical interpretation of knowledge as a desire for personal certainty, the main goal of a cognitive account is to reveal some truths that are far enough from the person who affirms them, so that she could not be questioned about them.
Consequently, the knowledge will remain circumscribed to some general patterns, which could never drag out the living relations with reality that are supposed in any intimate relation.
Therefore, a proficient path to improve human knowledge is that of leaving out the distant generality for the closeness of our intimacy with particulars. For instance, how could appear an explanation of the relation between philosophy and science in terms of the intimate feeling of envy? Or how could appear the metaphysical reflection, if we would take into account the contemptuous attitudes of some philosophers about their surrounding reality? In spite of their triviality, these questions renewed the philosophy many times.
The further step would be that of restituting the intimate attitudes in efficient means of inquiry. The human feelings, desires, and also their bodily sensations should be used in a way that maintains the intimacy of human beings with them. It would be about an intimacy never reached by the too general empirical theories.