duminică, 31 iulie 2011

‘The night’ he calls death

‘The night’ he calls death, in the which our members are bound, and wits put by, and we may not now work any healthful thing, but shall receive joy or tormentry according to our works.

Richard Rolle: Hermit of Hampole (c. 1300-1349), The Mending of Life

Though ‘night’ is a common way of calling death, it is hardly to be conceived a night apart from its alternation with the day. In such alternation, the night is not ours, but pertains to an external order. Its personal meaning is diminished by the day opened to be dwelled by all things and people.

They dwell it not as unmoved items in a larger place, but by using the movement of the day that has just went out from the night. Because of the same alternation, every day springs from the night, not just follows it.

Since the day is populated by a moving multitude of items, our works loose themselves among them till to the point that they are not recognized as ours. Those they not cease to be our own works, the day introduced the confusion proper to any moving multitude. There is not just a link between one’s work and other’s works. They are all together. Thus, the individuality is claimed, not simply confirmed.

From this reason, the claim of individuality slips away in excessive forms of expression. There are cast out not only other’s works, but also one’s own works. Thus, we have the tendency of separating thought from feelings, thought from words, and so on, even if they usually are found in an indistinct unity.

From this point of view, night as a simile of death reveals the most important unity constituted by a person: that between his moving members and thoughts or ‘wits’.

Night or death shows them as together in a now strictly personal possession. Since they are unmoved, they cannot be anymore confused and claimed apart in order to support an individual position.

Moreover, night as death discovers that both of them were together in the day time, too, when they could initiate works.

The belief in an eternal life of ‘joy’ or ‘tormentry’ is supposed to help us to adequate our works to divine laws. Beside such belief, there remains the possibility of expressing our individuality through works, and not anymore by a spoken claim.

And any personal work uses members and wits indistinctly.

sâmbătă, 30 iulie 2011

Note on the Tender Thought

Could be a tender thought wholly wrong? Almost no one would qualify simply as wrong such a thought; even if it would commit a gross error.

Is a tender thought tolerated just in the name of its well intention? Partially, yes. However, a different explanation could be that that such a thought is close to the suitable ways of searching for truth.

The shyness through which the tender thought appears is also a main feature of acquiring knowledge. Any claim of the privilege possessed by the reality is also a shy step backward.

Nonetheless, the shyness of knowledge before the things to be known is doubled by the audacious progress in knowing them (at least, it should be doubled, because the shyness often drives to a total retreat in conceptual frames).

The tender thought is not an affective manifestation. It becomes so, whenever it is not doubled by courage. By a move of recoiling into the person who gave birth to a tender thought, it comes to be isolated as that person is as an individual and finally is refuted as thoroughly as there is refuted any wrong thought. Specifically, a tender thought is refuted together with its proponent. We recognize this every time when we tolerate and equally isolate the tender religious believers.

vineri, 29 iulie 2011

Ramon Lull: Given Will and Possession

To man is given will, whereby he wills to possess for himself alone his castle or his city or his kingdom, or his possessions or his wife or his son, or his memory or his understanding or his will, and so of other things.

Ramon Lull, The Blanquerna: The Art of Contemplation

The will is paradoxically presented as a given property by an implicit belief in man as a created being. We may doubt the Christian doctrine of a given free will, but there is still worthy to pay attention if the will has indeed the features of a given thing.

How we can depict a given thing? Maybe it could not be fully understood from the perspective of the act of giving a thing to another. For this act is just a transitory one, from a state of possession to another.

A given thing is more evident understood from the state of possession. We have to read Ramon Lull’s text in a reversal way. When one wills to possess for himself alone his castle, we may say that such will is a given property only this fact occurs. For the exclusive possession of a thing, even if it appears as a desire, is the sign that that thing does not involve that openness required in the meeting of a thing which is attainable by us.

A thing that is not given cannot be possessed in an exclusive way. It can be only touched by us as a hand touches a tough matter, but it cannot ever become tough, too. Many instances as this one could be invoked, because it is the primary experience we have with the things surrounding us. The empirical theories of knowledge which consider that by sensation we take an image or idea of the thing perceived are in fact wrong conducted by the intention of viewing any act of knowing to be in our own possession.

As Ramon Lull’s examples of possessions reveal, it does not matter if the things acquired can be mastered thoroughly. The wife and the son will never be our own as a castle or a house, but they can be equally numbered among the things possessed. Since they are the objects of a given will, they loose their free and individual nature for the one who possesses them. Moreover, he himself is lost in his free nature by the act of possessing. He is given as the space where there can be placed a lot of things, persons, and intellectual acquisitions.

This seems to be the only peril of subjectivity: to renounce to your freedom of inquiry for being a given space of memories and meanings. As in the case of possessing a son, such subjectivity tends to ignore the free and seemingly real nature of the things of world that ultimately escape from anyone’s possession.

Correspondingly, the objectivity could not be the strong act of possessing universal knowledge, but has to be close to an act of going out from a conceptual apparatus prepared for comprehension (as con-capio) for a personal, but not a possessive survey of things.

The persistence of the ideal of objectivity can be explained as a consequence of viewing the will as a free act. However, the will of objectivity is not a free attitude of human conscience, but rather a given and comfortable way of escaping the assumption of a personal inquiry into the world.

Only a personal inquiry exposes the man to the others, whereas an objective knowledge isolated him in his ownership into a large but unknown community of other holders of objective knowledge.

joi, 28 iulie 2011

Trakl: Woe, the scream of those in labour

Woe, the scream of those in labour
G. Trakl, Birth

The birth scream proves to be an instance of the privilege of a wordless sound over a future set of acts and discourses. 

The value of such future set seems to depend on this sound. Maybe a birth would not count much as a matter of thought without the existence of such a sound. It is about the sound that can comprehend suffering at best. And maybe the birth of man and the man himself would be easily neglected if there would not be any phonetic sign of its appearance.

The progressive decay of the importance of a man appears when he is able to use the language.  Even if his voice bears an outstanding phonetic loudness, his sounds are judged merely as imperfect forms of discourse.

However, many human acts are more adequately expressed through non-linguistic sounds: suffering again, gladness, love, etc.

There is tentative to suppose that the discourses that get much importance are those, which could be alternatively be expressed by an unarticulated sound or a group of sounds. The words to be lower forms of manifestation of a hidden primary sound. The musical experience tells something about such possibility. At least, the reading of hearing of a discourse might be thought of privately from the perspective of its musicality. Could the music of a scientific discourse constitute a beautiful music?

In any case, such phonetic meanings of discourses do not make them ones that are able to go beyond humans, as music do. If we remember the birth crying, then we can testify about the humanity of such concealed music.

miercuri, 27 iulie 2011

Nietzsche: The Other World

But ‘the other world’ is well hidden from humans, that dehumaned, inhuman world that is a heavenly nothing.
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra

As the ancient philosophical paradox about the non-being about which we still can speak, about ‘the other world’ we are able to speak, too, though the solely world known is this one. At least, Nietzsche talks about it.

We may justify such occurrence of ‘the other world’ in Nietzsche’s discourse as a way of refuting the cultural and religious meanings of it.

But how does ‘this’ world is known to us? From Nietzsche’s claim, we can deduce by opposition to ‘the other world’ that it is easy noticeable, humanly determined, and truly and earthy existent. Is it yet a by product of the ‘other world’ in this description? If we maintain an affirmative answer, then we should deny that the criticism of the other world is just a refutation of a cultural or religious vestige.

‘The other world’ is the bearer of a human attitude to an object of knowledge hardly met in our conception about ‘this world’. For instance, there are rarely the cases when we accept that the objects of knowledge could be hidden from us. They are considered so close to us that we feel free from questioning them. Also, they are all in our human sphere, so that almost never we commit to the seemingly strange Kantian perspective about their epistemological origin in the human intellect. Nonetheless, the objects of knowledge have not the privilege of being viewed in their dynamic aspect as it could be a world that will come in the future, so that we always prefer to reserve the movement to our daily activities and feelings and not the theoretical information.

Thus, in spite of the unknown character of ‘the other world’, it is needed for revolving a deep indifference to our supposed known world. A word that is in lack of any reference could provide a thoroughly reinterpretation of an epistemological habit. The productive force of the fear of contradictions testifies about the great power of the senseless notions to provide sense for our discourses. Therefore, Nietzsche’s criticism is in fact a positive manner to direct to a change in our conception about this world.

Properly speaking, it is not ‘this’ world, as if we could point to it in an ostensive manner. It should be called and understood as a world that shares with us all its content. It should be ours as a piece of land or as a house that is in our own property. We can leave our house and it is still ours, we can go through it, and we are designated as his owners by other persons. Accordingly, our world must accept to be left, to be the place we travel through and to be recognized as our world by other persons. Shortly, the world would be both one that contains us and one contained by us.

Certainly, such a world is not neutral to the subjectivity, as it is the world in a scientific or epistemological account. ‘The other world’ is not an objective one, too. One believer does not wait for a world that is not his own. The so called ‘heavenly kingdom’ is divided to all human beings and it is the place of their own rewards, but it is not conceived as a personal world.

Thus, the religious conception of the other world suggests a way of thinking of this world. We are in fact obliged to speak about a plurality of worlds that are to be attributed to each individual, though not all individuals can fulfill the requirements of ownership that were mentioned above as regards the example of a house. For a similar reason, Nietzsche’s substitution of God with the overman describes an effort and not a simple replacement.

Contrary to Nietzsche’s manifest purpose, the religious view of the other world could not be abolished by a simple refutation of God’s existence. It has to be maintained as a permanent support to the construction of a personal and not simply a solipsist world. Even if we qualify it as a dream or an illusion, the other world proves its necessity as a refugee from the more illusionary view that there exists an objective world that could save us from ourselves.

Place and Human Beings

We denominate or call places while being assured that there are persons who can use the places as parts of their discourses.

There is not strange to give a name to a place which will never be populated, since there is a possibility to be used merely as a word by some people.

Likely, every time we conceive the world as an aggregation of places, there is easy to imagine it as a bared place with only a linguistic existence.

From such perspective, when we say and recognize that the world is populated by human beings, we place them under the same linguistic vagueness.

The general discourse about human beings is partly based on this linguistic interpretation of the places. When there are invoked general features of humanity in order to solve particulars problems about us, the language is not stopped about any necessary and impossible appeal to the community of real individuals.

The characteristics of places observed from a long distance, as extension and silence, are frequently transferred over human beings. In a theoretically account, they value as long they represent a numerical or temporal extension, and there is also possible to speak about them as if they actually have not the power to speak.

Nonetheless, we meet the same attitudes in the practical relations of life. The linguist import of places and the permanent reference to places in everyday activities are principal means of escaping the more difficult search for subduing our linguistic habits to the individuality of every person we meet.

duminică, 24 iulie 2011

Nietzsche: Joy and the Eternity of Things

Joy wants the eternity of all things, wants deep, wants deep eternity.
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra

It is a common fact of life that one who feels joy excludes any thought of the decaying nature of things.

A sense of joy should be presupposed in any active involvement in life. A gloomy attitude to the world comes about only after a judgment of scare possibilities of joyful intentions of living to be fulfilled.  

As Nietzsche partially claims, joy has volition and even it generates thoughts.  When it ‘wants the eternity of all things’, there is also expressed a consideration of things as a general class.

The generality derived from the sense of joy is close related to that we assume in theoretical inquiries. For the general nature of concepts enjoys the eternity, too. However, they have not the power of wanting eternity, but their eternity is assumed from the start of inquiries and it is actually wanted by the inquirer and thereafter concealed in the act of researching.

The division of eternity by claiming only eternal concepts or formulae is the main cause of alienating theoretical knowledge from the joy involved in an active participation to the world. Such selection of eternity makes a lot of individual things to drop dead or to be viewed as meaningless because of their decaying nature.

There is not the case of judging if the all things are really eternal or not, since we should place ourselves in a different position of viewing all things together than the way they appear for a sense of joy.

It is rather appropriate to follow how theoretical knowledge excludes things from eternity just because of its impossibility to cope with their totality experienced through the joyful volition. This impossibility also counts for the remaining eternity attributed to the concepts or formulae. They could not possess a ‘deep’ eternity, but only a shallow one. From this point of view, theoretical eternity leaves behind the feeling of longing after a deep eternity, with not more credentials than those acquired by a religious believer in eternity of life. There are rare cases when the belief in an eternal life is deemed to be an attitude of joy.

For instance, a scientific account of the universe does not preclude a subsequent feeling of sadness for the impossibility of becoming closer to the eternal concepts deployed.

Again in Nietzsche’s custom of viewing life, one should guard that the insufficient eternity of theoretical knowledge not to undermine by resentment the thoughts directed to a total and deep eternity of things.

sâmbătă, 23 iulie 2011

Note on the Generality of Life

In spite of their individuality, the facts of life come to generality because of their association.

‘One day after another’, ‘one act after another’ are not expressions that name a successive ordering of some elements with the same vivid force. Surely, each element looses its force as an irreducible individual item, though it remains the same individual element.

Thus, the explanation of generality as an abstraction of common features does not function at least in the case of the facts of life.

As a consequence, there would not be permitted to speak about a life as a panel of equally vivid elements and neither as a matter from which we can abstract common features.

However, the bibliographical records often commit to the first way of speaking about a life, while general accounts of humanity prefer the second.

More adequate than both ways it is a discourse that would attempt to describe a life by noticing its permanent fading because of the succession of its facts. It could be a continual fading for raising more clearly the goal we living for (for instance, the life of a philosopher progressively disappears behind his or her works) or the world in which one lives.

Nietzsche: Our Faith in Others

Our faith in others betrays the areas in which we would like to have faith in ourselves. Our longing for a friend is our betrayer.
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra

Is it a moral statement? Is it an instance of those statements that refute the compassion of Christian morality?

Its egoistical trend argues for an affirmative answer to both of the questions. But any exclusion of morality by the praise of an amoral attitude should speak about something else than morality.

Certainly, we do not profess our faith in others; it is not a pair of the religious faith. It is a faith dependent from the areas we go through. Anywhere we travel by our inquiries, we do not find primary the things pertaining to those areas. For instance, in the area of religion, we do not find God, but human speeches about him; in science, we do not find pure things, without our conceptual apparatus for designating them.

But we meet human determinations everywhere. Therefore, they seem to be those areas themselves, as Kant considered about our custom to view the phenomena as the things themselves.

The faith we keep for our inquiries into an area spreads over its human determinations, too. The faith in our inquiries is the strongest. We can excludes some results reached by an inquiry, but we cannot accept that our preoccupation for one kind of matters. Because such refutation equates with the refutation of our own life dedicated to it. For the same reason, one believer will not renounce to his belief, if this was acquired through a life time effort. On the contrary, even the martyrdom for that belief would seem easier.

The faith in ourselves requires more effort to be attained. It is needed a firm position assumed before investigation of any area of inquiry. In spite of the same distance from the things pertaining to such areas, we should redraw them by finding in us the power that others proved insensibly, since they caused their human determination.

This power precedes the inquiry and as such it is paradoxically weaker than the certainty we assume by inquiring. Accordingly, the faith in ourselves bears on the mark of much uncertainty.

The faith in us becomes an act of courage or of the Greek tolme. Properly speaking, not an act of an egoistical confidence, but an act of abandoning ourselves to the areas of inquiry, so that they could be marked off by the downward movement of that abandon. For instance, it would be expected that we renounce to our high rational and scientific conception about movement for seeing the things moved in accordance or discordance with the movements that are involved in our non-rational behavior.

As regards morality, contrary to Nietzsche’s attributed purpose, such faith in ourselves as an abandon would take the form of a consistent altruism. For we never fully dedicate to others, if we are not ready to loose a strong self in the behalf of them. It is proved a strong self in the refutation of others’ determination of the world. Afterwards, the abandon of that strong self is the very fact of still speaking about the world common to all.

The intellectual nature of this sort of altruism does not diminish it, if we take into account Kant’s criticism of the easiness purported by the human inclinations to morality. The comfort of ‘longing for a friend’ is also an inclination.

vineri, 22 iulie 2011

Nietzsche: Solitude and Market Place

Where solitude ends, there begins the market place; and where the market place begins, there begins too the noise of the great actors and the buzzing of poisonous flies

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra

But what could be the noise of the solitude? Is not the market place the place where the language starts, since the market place is the linguistic community?

We might draw from Nietzsche’s claim that the solitude is in the neighborhood of the market place. Therefore, we may imagine that the solitude may capture from the market place its echoes and that should be the way of acquiring language in solitariness.

Because we cannot imagine how could speak one who is totally apart from a linguistic community. The echo fades the sounds and makes them to be heard in a repetitive way.

If we add that only religious, poetical or philosophical thinker could be in the solitude, then we should look after their language as one that provides an extrapolation of language from its full use in the linguistic community. This would be also a way of explaining the function of abstraction.

By admitting such a meaning of abstraction, we should grant further that any abstract language is in a loss as long we compare it with the common language. The greatest loss occurs in the cases where we cannot identify any solitude behind the abstract language, since there are great motives to suspect they are dramatic performances. The abstraction is a simile of a mask of an actor, even if we never may classify a mask among false and unreal things. The abstraction increasingly imposes itself to linguistic community as its language, since the community is accustomed to listen to ‘the noise of the great actors’.

But the abstraction, as we mentioned before, is essentially a faded representation of common language.

Consequently, for distinguishing the language of solitude from the common language, we should recognize the solitary roots of the first. For instance, one should not to refer to the epistemological acts by ignoring that they are to be found together with all that is familiar to someone in his solitude: volition, moral attitudes, believes and so on.

This recognition does not preclude the access to an objective point of view, because the relation with the common language as an echoing of it implies also the repetitive manner of speaking. This means that we maintain as manifestations of a solitary language all those items that can be repeated, and, in this way, we acquire a means of controlling the subjectivity. Because no subjective view can be repeated, since it is confined to the individual nature of the moments of someone’s life.

joi, 21 iulie 2011

Pleasure and Knowledge in Aristotle's Metaphysics, 980a1-6

Is the pleasure a means of acquiring knowledge or simply a sign of its desirability?

The question can be answered by revealing the kinship of pleasure with knowledge. In an analysis proper to classical epistemology, pleasure describes a relation between a subject and an object as knowledge does. The pleasurable object comes to be apprehended through its reception by the subject who feels pleasure, whereas the object of knowledge becomes closer by its understanding, for which the subject testifies by giving an account.

The difference would be that between the subjectivity of pleasure and the possible objectivity of knowledge.

However, in the opening of Metaphysics, Aristotle primarily speaks about senses and thereafter about the pleasure of exercising them. In spite of this order, we may say that a debatable affirmation of a human faculty is to be subdued to its functioning. While we see a thing, we never explain this by invoking the use of our sense of sight. Moreover, any act of seeing comprises many other elements which could not be explained by a physiological analysis of sight. Therefore, the pleasure felt by seeing is more adequate for being related with the act of knowledge.

From the above consideration, we are not in right to classify sensorial pleasure as a simple sign of the desire to know. It should means much in the virtue of its similitude with knowledge. We rather call it a sign as one person is a sign for her relatives. This seems to be the meaning of the last proposition of Aristotle’s quoted paragraph, too.

The first place assigned by Aristotle to sensorial pleasure makes us to believe that the analogy with a ‘family resemblance’ should state that pleasure is the ancestor of knowledge. Nonetheless, we know that pleasure and knowledge may exist independently. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that pleasure does not beget knowledge, but took an advance over it by imposing a certain structure as genetic transmission does in a family.

It does this at the level of analyzing knowledge. Pleasure seems to impose the meaning of knowledge as a relation between a subject and an object. By doing so, it was obscured the fact that we share with the things known a lot of different relations and contextual intricacies. Especially, it is attributed to knowledge the temporary aspect of a pleasure and its indifference to the object.

The pleasure is a matter of consumption just for a while, but knowledge is attributed in its proper sense to a man that has a long lasting state of knowledge. The knower can sleep and wake still as a knower. Against this common experience, the limitation of knowledge to propositions suggests that it functions for a short time like pleasure does. Thus, there was analyzed the justification of the believe in the moment when the proposition is asserted.

Secondly, the relation of pleasure with its object does not involve a sort of a real involvement in its existence, being evaluated just for its relational capacity of guaranteeing the feeling of pleasure. Meanwhile, knowledge is obliged by its claim of objectivity to escape from the limited area of reception outer information into a supposed inner faculty.

Moreover, the pleasure modifies the understanding of knowledge by imposing to it the model of sense satisfaction. We generally expect that the knowledge of a thing to be satisfactory and to finish when it gives such a satisfaction. Such a common believe is in fact a main source of errors, because there are many proposition and accounts that offer satisfaction, even if they are really false. Also, there are many incomplete or partial accounts that leave us without any satisfaction, but drag us to a higher state of knowledge.

Consequently, the pleasure is not only a sign of the desire to know, but also the sign of a desire to know in a superficial manner. 

miercuri, 20 iulie 2011


The divine names used in imprecations distinguish themselves from human names by their sonority.

For instance, the Latin ‘Domine’ keeps in its phonic aspect a way of addressing names with an openness that overlaps the sheer efficiency of calling someone.

By praying to God, it seems that we do not look after a sort of soul salvation, but rather we search for a necessary salvation of the words from the limited communicational contexts.

Again, they are primarily limited because of their phonetic simplicity. Any extension of the vocals of someone’s name tells nothing about the extension of that person, but only about her extension in us. If we call her in the manner of an imprecation, there would be a case of malfunctioning of communication and not one of passing beyond it.

Only what we deem to be divine supports the extension of our calling.

We cannot decide anything as regards the question about the existence of God while we call him through imprecations, nor while we hear them.  To affirm or deny the existence of God pertains to a communicational language, one with short and limited sounds.

Love, Whole

Someone does not deliver himself to the others as a whole in common situations of life and often never in his entire life.

Anybody represents a whole, at least because anybody bears on a body that has all limbs bound together.

However, the others could receive only discontinuous aspects, ready for being interpreted as positive and negative. Or, in a moral sense, they reveal themselves as good and bad at the same time. Because everything separated from a whole cannot resist to such a double interpretation. Firstly in the history of philosophy, Heraclitus made a great picture of the both sided and opposed nature of the things that compound the unitary whole of the world.

We do not see the negative side of the properties that compounds someone only as long we envisage him or her as a whole. Therefore, the love for a definite person may ignore all her negative properties, and positive properties are also overlooked when we hate someone.

We cannot establish if the lover or the hater wrongs in their partial reception of the other. Both sentiments acts in their own right, both are naturally orientated to the person in a manner that is commonly called blind. Their short time life is due to such partial reception, too.  If the person loved or hated is not really a whole for the others, it is not to be found a firm basis of sentiments. It is required something as the ancient platonic idea of beauty, a more than human and a timeless whole.

Otherwise, in human matters, we have to substitute this whole with an approximation of the world possessed by other persons. In spite of an immense literature about human sentiments, this world frequently opens to others through an exposure of clear material and bodily signs.

marți, 19 iulie 2011

Aristotle's Metaphysics, 980a1-6

‘All men by nature desire to know’ – The nature of man appears at the very beginning of Aristotle’s first book of Metaphysics. Such place could be count as an expression of Aristotle’s purpose to ground his new science of being on the natural existence of man. We may also see a tendency shared by any individual, namely that of founding any issued statement on a ground that both surpasses and encompasses his position.  At the same time, the practice of communication reaches its level of openness and efficiency in the moments when persons do not confine themselves to some firm grounds of this type. We cannot prolong a conversation and even a friendship with someone who conceives himself or herself in a strong relation to a superior being or domain and recognizes his or her intimacy with it. Therefore, any statement supported by an invocation of a sort of authority as that of nature should be questioned about its capacity to cope with an efficient language. There is not an intention to reduce a discourse to the value of conversation, but rather to guard its capacity to bind the difference of the things as conversations do in an exemplary way, because of their basis on the multiplicity of different individuals.

At least in part, Aristotle’s invocation of nature escapes the above mentioned tendency. Because he refers to an aspect of human nature that is itself contrary to a nature of man, which someone might easily classify among superior and encompassing entities. He names the activity of desiring and not a reputed natural property as it could be the faculty of reasoning. However, Aristotle regresses from the action of desiring to the claim of a faculty beginning with the second sentence, since he refers to ‘our senses’. The act of desiring is subdued to the senses and, from this point on, it is left out a conception of knowledge able to take into account the human nature in its common appearance, as a desirable one and as a capacity to move lively through different theoretical and practical items. Or, as Aristotle himself states in the same paragraph, it is omitted the natural penchant to reveal ‘many differences between things’.

The lively movement could be discovered in the acts which we usually place in the domain of senses. The preference or love for the senses themselves is motivated just for such lively attitude to the things. Knowledge is a byproduct of the well apprehension assured by the sensorial activity in connection with thoughts and words. Aristotle’s oscillation between the sober invocation of the nature of man and the sheer presentation of its desirability could drive to an interpretation of his new born first philosophy as a theory in fact partially attentive to what stays on a pre-theoretical level of apprehension.

The Immediacy of Definitions

The immediacy of the operation of definition, one that was firstly invoked by Aristotle, is not motivated only by reasoning purposes.

For such reasons, the immediacy guarantees that the definitional statement does not leave room for further interpretations, which could close it to a conclusion of an argument supported by unexpressed premises.

Here we have enclosed the believe that definition could surpass our slowness of thinking and our current uncertainty, both of them involved by the act of producing an argument. The strong assertion of the defined things would replace the weakness of our thought.

From this point of view, definition is not contrary only to arguments, but also to the act of producing arguments.

The virtues of definitions should spread in the arguments where they are used, but actually we use them into forms of thinking characterized by contrary virtues. Therefore, all the arguments that use definitional statements search not only to prove a thesis, but also reconciliation between different properties.

The reconciliation is often realized by subduing argumentative slowness and uncertainty to the immediacy and certainty of the premises included. Thus, the authoritative force of an argument grows and conceals its natural weakness.

From a so called moral perspective, such authoritative arguments prove a lack of sincerity. For someone who is confident in the definitional statements, it is a natural move of the arguments. We are normally obliged to adequate our weakness of thought to the supposed objective power of definitions.

The success of an argument built with the aid of definitional statements does not exclude the loose of sincerity. It is a great loose, if we take into account the fact that sincerity (or being sincere, gr. aletheuein) is our proximate image of the truth (gr. aletheia).

Or, we may call the sincerity another kind of immediacy than that claimed by definitional statements. It is the immediacy of recognition the weakness of our thought and, for this reason, the weakness does not imply a relativistic attitude to the possibility of reaching the truth.

On the contrary, its sincere assumption makes someone to explore what are the virtues of weakness. The most important virtue is the perseverance of philosophical inquiries from one thing to another, since it is not believed that one thing could be circumscribed by a definitional statement and thus to be known by itself. The lack of power in circumscribing leaves the chance to view a thing in a living connection with other ones.

For instance, we might realize that the immediacy of the act of definition is closely related to a set of acts, not only thinking acts, for which we claim or need their quickly achievement.


duminică, 17 iulie 2011

Lacrimosa dies illa

Lacrimosa dies illa
Qua resurget ex favilla
Judicandus homo reus.

[Mournful that day
When from the dust shall rise
Guilty man to be judged]


The admission of a day of moral judgment defies the common practice of expressing different moral judgments.

Also, there is said something about the insufficiency of such practice to establish a temporal moral order. The most successful moral enterprises are those which could create moral states temporally countable.

A moral life contains more morality than a purposive account of morality. There is not the contrast between life and theory. At the first glance, it is the discrepancy between an appropriation of morality and the discourse about it. At the second glance, we might see that the appropriation of morality into an individual life should be described as a life and in a secondary way as a moral life.

There is not a general moral theory embodied in an individual, but rather that individual makes his life in such a way that it can be qualified as a moral one. If we are interested in collecting exempla, the main interest should be that of understanding how can be transformed the discontinuous life in a time determined in a certain way.

 Such understanding requires more than learning about moral lives. The simple commemoration   of lives shows them as simple stories, too. The experience of others’ life stories is never sufficient for emulation. Because such stories constitutes the main source of turning back to others’ lives. We abandon others, lovers, parents, or children wherever we believe or realize they have different stories of lives than our own.

Therefore, the possibility of building a moral life as a moral temporally order has no use for others’ chance of talking about morality. It would remain that single „lacrimosa dies illa”. Or, more fruitful for philosophy, it remains the chance of discussing morality in the shape of other terms than those of ethical theories and judgments.

Its mournful appearance could be talked and understood, since it is anticipated by our life. The incapacity of talking meaningful about morality shows us in the position of spreading our moments of life as disordered as the movement of the dust. Any hint of an ordered understanding of our own existence can be obtained only by working out the disordered elements that compound our life: a sort of rising from the dust.

The mournful appearance of our life increases when someone is permanently conscious of his possibility of being a whole. The continuous quarrel between the spreading of our life and the consciousness of being a whole gives birth to the hope of existing a divine judgment day of a merciful judge. One who could save the guilty man, that is the man who could not be so far from the nature of dust.

sâmbătă, 16 iulie 2011

On the Firm Arguments

Argumentation is not to be considered as a constrainable method of philosophy, as we have the scientific language for natural sciences.

The argument is a molding form of supporting believes just because of its firmness. The playful and mystifying discourses often use firmness as their spectacular way of persuading. For instance, beginning with Aristophanes’ Clouds, the firmness of some characters contributes to the superficial atmosphere of a comedy.

The extensive use of arguments slips away from the discourse to its receptors, reducing itself to its persuasive significance. This flowing act of argumentation testifies the fact that its firmness is in fact movable from the person who arguments to those which hear or read the arguments exposed.

The fluidness of firm arguments can anytime to be controlled and, for this reason, it is shadowed by a subtle mark of subjectivity. This is not still a fault until we discover that such subjectivity is blocked and contaminated by the firmness of arguments. Specifically, when the uniqueness and the free movement generally attributed to any individual who is supposed to have a subjective manner of thinking are extinct by the common laws of reasoning and the rigid framework of constructing arguments.

Such elusion of positive subjectivity for the claim of a perfect firmness of argumentation damaged and still damages the access of those opinions that express a sort of lucidity of understanding. The lucidity or the clear image about a state of facts is the simile of an immediate grasp of a thing, often denominated as intuition as an attempt to organize in the province of epistemology what goes beyond of any classification.

 When we grasp a thing, we never do this with the aid of some other things that would correspond to the firm steps of an argument. It is a brutal act of possessing. For a brutal grasping of an idea, the arguments are added thereafter and may remain a lot from the initial subjective possession. Such ideas could never be strong rivals of the objective apparatus of an argumentative discourse. However, their subjectivity is in fact freer from the intention of persuading others. This means freer from the control of the person who arguments.

The subjectivity of a ‘lucid’ thinker is too obvious for being obscured by the strategy of persuading others under the mask of speaking in the name of some firm and objective arguments.


vineri, 15 iulie 2011

Hilarious Philosophy

Many times, the  reversal of a state of facts takes the form of a hilarious situation.

And each hilarious situation places the language in the strange position of being an attachment of the context where it is used. The words loose their explanatory weight in the behalf of the movement among the speakers (the physical movement of laughing is a concrete example) and their circumstances.

A simple joke bears on an amount of living atmosphere that would make jealous a speech attentive to find real referents to its propositions.

The Copernican movement of Kantian philosophy might be so impressive exactly for the simple fact of being a reversal movement, one that may provoke someone to laugh at his believes in a realistic view of the world.

The hilarious echo of a discourse does not take always the form of a jest, especially not in a philosophical discourse. Sometimes such echo appears at the start of an account, as in Kant’s Critique, sometimes in the body of the discourse, as in some Platonic dialogues.

Rarely, but maybe this is the most precious manner of being hilarious in philosophy, the end of a discourse saves the possibility of laughing. It is involved the hilarity caused by the reversal of the first movement of any philosophical discourse. Any of them starts from the motivation of explaining a general aspect and as the final result, it comes to be discovered that we cannot think of that aspect in another way than that philosophical discourse did, in spite of our pretence of being all familiar with the general matters.

Therefore, the philosophical discourse needs not to be attentive to not offend the common opinions, if their reversal makes it vivid and, moreover, closer to reality. It does not matter how hilarious or ridiculous could appear to others.

joi, 14 iulie 2011

Tuba mirum spargens sonum...

Tuba mirum spargens sonum
Per sepulcra regionum
Coget omnes ante thronum.
[A trumpet, spreading a wondrous sound
Through the graves of all lands,
Will drive mankind before the throne.]

The whole of mankind, dead or alive, could not be raised without an uncommon sound. In this point, any word is weak.

The alternative is rather a conjunction, since all the human beings are potential dead.

When we speak about mankind in fairly common words, it cannot rise in its entirety. Often it cannot rise altogether. Not at all, if we maintain a discourse about living men and ignore that they are in all lands, in the deep chambers of the earth.

Only the trumpet of a final judgment can qualify itself as the righteous speaker about mankind. It is the single possibility of comprehending all mankind, since there is supposed that the mankind will end any process of historical existence.

The chance of a more justly discourse about mankind is just by imitating the divine trumpet. The words should imitate the act of spreading, abandoning the current manner of predication. They should spread beside the human beings, too. The old philosophical practice of including the account of man into the larger discussion of nature needs still to be revisited.

Moreover, mankind should be discussed as a whole for extraneous purposes, as there would be possible to bring it before a throne. Otherwise, we limit to speak only about partial aspects of humanity, in spite of an unavoidable practice of using universal propositions.

miercuri, 13 iulie 2011

Urăşte-ţi aproapele

Să vină, dar, moartea peste ei,
să se coboare de vii în lăcaşul morţilor,
căci răutate este în sălaşul lor şi în inimile lor.

Dar eu către Dumnezeu voi striga
şi Domnul mă va mântui (Psalmul 55, 16-17)

Şi ura sau ura conduce la Dumnezeu mai curând decât iubirea aproapelui.

Aceasta când ştii să-i vezi pe alţii drept duşmani, să îi vezi în necesitatea de a nu mai fi. O necesitate prezentă „în sălaşul lor şi în inimile lor” ca răutate. Sunt în felul acesta în ei înşişi împotriva ta. Şi nu te lasă să fii şi tu în sălaşul tău şi în inima ta.

Nu te lasă în varii moduri, te ocupă prin cuvinte ce-ţi sunt împotrivă pentru că nu sunt ale tale, chiar dacă tu însuţi este cel care le pronunţă, pentru că nu îţi îngăduie o deschidere proprie către altceva, de vreme ce ei hotăresc regulile pentru ce trebuie deschis şi împărţit public.

Dacă ai vedea că duşmanii îţi sunt semeni, nu cumva ai greşi la fel, fără să îi laşi să fie „în sălaşul lor şi în inima lor”? Caracterul gregar al răutăţii este înlocuit cu opusul la fel de gregar al bunătăţii faţă de tine şi faţă de ceilalţi.

De aceea, pentru a reuşi să-i iubeşti pe ceilalţi ca pe semenii tăi, trebuie să faci un ocol printr-o abandonare a sinelui în divin. Mai multă corectitudine este în a-i iubi ca pe fraţi ai lui Dumnezeu decât ca pe proprii tăi fraţi.

Şi este posibil ca începutul ocolului să fie ura şi dorinţa ca semenii „să se coboare de vii în lăcaşul morţilor”.

Strigătul către Dumnezeu capătă astfel gravitatea singurătăţii, deopotrivă şi obscuritatea rostirii lui din preajma unui lăcaş al morţilor.

Against the Moral Truth

Any precautious discourse about a beginning diminishes its inaugural force.

If one explains to another how to eat while the second eats by himself, the speaker looses the primacy over the action of his intended disciple.

Apart from such trivial examples, we have to question whether is recommended an inaugural beginning. It is, since we know that the world is a chain of happenings. Every event should grant its specific by mastering its beginning, development and end.

And a recommended action could never constitute one that really happens. This is one source of believing that some things have merely an appearance of existence: when particular things or events do not survive by themselves.

For the domain of morality, the lack of precautions prior to actions equates to an abolishment of the normative discourse. We cannot prescribe moral rules without assuming that the actions so prescribed loose their similitude with the other non-moral processes independently developed.

This assumption bears on the further assumption that it is clearly apart from the reality undetermined by human judgment. In a sense, there is possible to say that morality takes over the risk of being far away from the comfortable support derived from the reality, or that it deliberately places itself outside of the domain of attributing truth to our judgments.

In spite of all above mentioned, if we claim a moral reality apart from a natural one, there is not escape from the simple accusation that such reality has a particular human author or authors.