duminică, 24 iulie 2011

Nietzsche: Joy and the Eternity of Things

Joy wants the eternity of all things, wants deep, wants deep eternity.
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra

It is a common fact of life that one who feels joy excludes any thought of the decaying nature of things.

A sense of joy should be presupposed in any active involvement in life. A gloomy attitude to the world comes about only after a judgment of scare possibilities of joyful intentions of living to be fulfilled.  

As Nietzsche partially claims, joy has volition and even it generates thoughts.  When it ‘wants the eternity of all things’, there is also expressed a consideration of things as a general class.

The generality derived from the sense of joy is close related to that we assume in theoretical inquiries. For the general nature of concepts enjoys the eternity, too. However, they have not the power of wanting eternity, but their eternity is assumed from the start of inquiries and it is actually wanted by the inquirer and thereafter concealed in the act of researching.

The division of eternity by claiming only eternal concepts or formulae is the main cause of alienating theoretical knowledge from the joy involved in an active participation to the world. Such selection of eternity makes a lot of individual things to drop dead or to be viewed as meaningless because of their decaying nature.

There is not the case of judging if the all things are really eternal or not, since we should place ourselves in a different position of viewing all things together than the way they appear for a sense of joy.

It is rather appropriate to follow how theoretical knowledge excludes things from eternity just because of its impossibility to cope with their totality experienced through the joyful volition. This impossibility also counts for the remaining eternity attributed to the concepts or formulae. They could not possess a ‘deep’ eternity, but only a shallow one. From this point of view, theoretical eternity leaves behind the feeling of longing after a deep eternity, with not more credentials than those acquired by a religious believer in eternity of life. There are rare cases when the belief in an eternal life is deemed to be an attitude of joy.

For instance, a scientific account of the universe does not preclude a subsequent feeling of sadness for the impossibility of becoming closer to the eternal concepts deployed.

Again in Nietzsche’s custom of viewing life, one should guard that the insufficient eternity of theoretical knowledge not to undermine by resentment the thoughts directed to a total and deep eternity of things.