sâmbătă, 23 iulie 2011

Nietzsche: Our Faith in Others


Our faith in others betrays the areas in which we would like to have faith in ourselves. Our longing for a friend is our betrayer.
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra

Is it a moral statement? Is it an instance of those statements that refute the compassion of Christian morality?

Its egoistical trend argues for an affirmative answer to both of the questions. But any exclusion of morality by the praise of an amoral attitude should speak about something else than morality.

Certainly, we do not profess our faith in others; it is not a pair of the religious faith. It is a faith dependent from the areas we go through. Anywhere we travel by our inquiries, we do not find primary the things pertaining to those areas. For instance, in the area of religion, we do not find God, but human speeches about him; in science, we do not find pure things, without our conceptual apparatus for designating them.

But we meet human determinations everywhere. Therefore, they seem to be those areas themselves, as Kant considered about our custom to view the phenomena as the things themselves.

The faith we keep for our inquiries into an area spreads over its human determinations, too. The faith in our inquiries is the strongest. We can excludes some results reached by an inquiry, but we cannot accept that our preoccupation for one kind of matters. Because such refutation equates with the refutation of our own life dedicated to it. For the same reason, one believer will not renounce to his belief, if this was acquired through a life time effort. On the contrary, even the martyrdom for that belief would seem easier.

The faith in ourselves requires more effort to be attained. It is needed a firm position assumed before investigation of any area of inquiry. In spite of the same distance from the things pertaining to such areas, we should redraw them by finding in us the power that others proved insensibly, since they caused their human determination.

This power precedes the inquiry and as such it is paradoxically weaker than the certainty we assume by inquiring. Accordingly, the faith in ourselves bears on the mark of much uncertainty.

The faith in us becomes an act of courage or of the Greek tolme. Properly speaking, not an act of an egoistical confidence, but an act of abandoning ourselves to the areas of inquiry, so that they could be marked off by the downward movement of that abandon. For instance, it would be expected that we renounce to our high rational and scientific conception about movement for seeing the things moved in accordance or discordance with the movements that are involved in our non-rational behavior.

As regards morality, contrary to Nietzsche’s attributed purpose, such faith in ourselves as an abandon would take the form of a consistent altruism. For we never fully dedicate to others, if we are not ready to loose a strong self in the behalf of them. It is proved a strong self in the refutation of others’ determination of the world. Afterwards, the abandon of that strong self is the very fact of still speaking about the world common to all.

The intellectual nature of this sort of altruism does not diminish it, if we take into account Kant’s criticism of the easiness purported by the human inclinations to morality. The comfort of ‘longing for a friend’ is also an inclination.