We could recognize some forms of opposition to other notions in the case of most of our commonsensical concepts.
For instance, ‘house’ does oppose to ‘my house’. And ‘my house’ is a non-commonsensical notion just for the individual nature of its referent (we might express any set of individual properties by using commonsensical notions), but for its poor occurrence in the really common contexts of speaking. For nobody communicates such concepts by expecting that others may comprehend his own understanding of them. Therefore, there is not a fully sharing of meanings, one that is supposed to matter in a common conversation.
A non-commonsensical notion requires a long process of apprehension, which is inappropriate to be done in a communicational context. This process involves a gradual detachment from the common notions; to apprehend what means for someone ‘my house’, you should be clarified yourself how it is different from the common understanding of ‘house’. Then, you should exclude one after another the well known meanings of ‘house’.
But in the practice of language, the exploration of the non-commonsensical notions is rarely done. It is preferred instead their assimilation to the common concepts.
Such assimilation could be thought as a way of adulterating and ignoring the well known fact that we frequently use concepts without any intention to communicate them to other people.
This particular use of concepts is not a theoretical affair, but a practical thinking of them. As a philosophical inquire does, our concepts receive different interpretations, since they improve or loose some meanings along with the practical contexts of using them. By traveling, ‘my house’ means a different thing than those supposed while living at home.
The plurality of interpretations points out to the fact that out concepts are located in problematic contexts, since every interpretation stays to the others in a disjunctive relation. The preference for a disjunctive term or another does not seem as an acute problem just for the fact that they come in a temporal succession. Otherwise, if they are viewed apart from their succession, as for instance, in a memory, there could be conspicuous those tensional relations which we commonly attribute to philosophical investigations.
While the common sense darkens their problematic character, the philosophical research exposes it in its own terms. Though a reputed philosophical manner is to fight with commonsensical acceptance of our concepts, its primary target should be to form an image of our everyday problems with non-commonsensical notions. Therefore, a special duty of philosophy would be to transform the temporal succession in a non-temporal order. A different and more difficult task of philosophy is to succeed in speaking about non-communicational understanding of things.