sâmbătă, 16 iulie 2011

On the Firm Arguments

Argumentation is not to be considered as a constrainable method of philosophy, as we have the scientific language for natural sciences.

The argument is a molding form of supporting believes just because of its firmness. The playful and mystifying discourses often use firmness as their spectacular way of persuading. For instance, beginning with Aristophanes’ Clouds, the firmness of some characters contributes to the superficial atmosphere of a comedy.

The extensive use of arguments slips away from the discourse to its receptors, reducing itself to its persuasive significance. This flowing act of argumentation testifies the fact that its firmness is in fact movable from the person who arguments to those which hear or read the arguments exposed.

The fluidness of firm arguments can anytime to be controlled and, for this reason, it is shadowed by a subtle mark of subjectivity. This is not still a fault until we discover that such subjectivity is blocked and contaminated by the firmness of arguments. Specifically, when the uniqueness and the free movement generally attributed to any individual who is supposed to have a subjective manner of thinking are extinct by the common laws of reasoning and the rigid framework of constructing arguments.

Such elusion of positive subjectivity for the claim of a perfect firmness of argumentation damaged and still damages the access of those opinions that express a sort of lucidity of understanding. The lucidity or the clear image about a state of facts is the simile of an immediate grasp of a thing, often denominated as intuition as an attempt to organize in the province of epistemology what goes beyond of any classification.

 When we grasp a thing, we never do this with the aid of some other things that would correspond to the firm steps of an argument. It is a brutal act of possessing. For a brutal grasping of an idea, the arguments are added thereafter and may remain a lot from the initial subjective possession. Such ideas could never be strong rivals of the objective apparatus of an argumentative discourse. However, their subjectivity is in fact freer from the intention of persuading others. This means freer from the control of the person who arguments.

The subjectivity of a ‘lucid’ thinker is too obvious for being obscured by the strategy of persuading others under the mask of speaking in the name of some firm and objective arguments.