Though there is commonly agreed that a moral theory or account suitable for daily life is one that appeals to moderation and to the counting of utility, the rare occasions when morality enters in one’s life do not leave time for reasoning about moderation or utility.
The elaboration of a moral account for daily life is justified by the rarity of the sudden entrance of morality in current life, but it still remains unjustified if it does not answer which is the proportion of morality and which of the simple facts of life in its analyses.
A discourse about moderation, moral reasoning and utility cannot provide a firm reason against viewing it as a simple attempt of ordering facts of life. And such ordering has not the power to really order or commend over the things approached, since there is not involved the authoritative power met in those rare occasions when morality clearly appears.
Therefore, when a moral account of daily life is adopted, the reasons rather reside in the need of individuals to decline the authority of morality on their own behalf. Without the power of commending, the force of such a moral is compounded from an aggregation of means of authority: the supposed common sense, the personal interest of those who adopt such moral explanation, the appeal to the common sense.
To become unsubdued to such morality does not mean to act against the rules of utility or moderation, but to extend the area of the things approached by it, so that it would be impossible to establish any authority over them. And such movement against morality is carried on simply by living more facts of life.