If we admit that the premises succeed in fact the conclusion, since they are chosen according to it, then it is possible to infer that the premises and the whole argument also share the conclusiveness of the conclusion.
The conclusiveness is different from the conclusion itself and cannot be understood only as an effect of the inner constitution of an argument.
The conclusiveness is an expression of the persuasive nature of an argument and, for this reason, it precedes the argument itself. Such anteriority is detained by the arguer in respect of his decision to support the conclusion by collecting premises and enclosing them in the form of an argument.
His decision and its outcome of enclosing premises are often stronger than the ideas for which he argues. For ideas should be free from the direct and decisive influence of those who establish them.
But the freedom of ideas equates with their weakness. They cannot resist to the power of decision that is possessed by the arguer. Therefore, in the process of building arguments through gathering premises for an idea, it often has a secondary role. And the strength of an argument proves to be not the strength of an idea defended as a conclusion, but the strength of the arguer himself.