Is it harder to be bad than to be good? An echo of one of the questions put in Plato’s Protagoras.
Seemingly, to this question cannot be answered by a comparison of the empirical endeavors of being good or bad. Not the individual facts answer to this question, but it should be addressed the whole of a person.
Can be a person completely bad or good? Again, Plato has already established that it is not the case of such completeness in the range of morality.
Hence, it seems that an answer to the first question is indifferent to the two moral values. The answer would be: it is hard to be morally qualified as a whole.
However, it remains a difference. Because of the impossibility of becoming good or bad as a whole, the completeness is reached more or less as long as the individual deeds of a person imply the configuration of some wholes of the things met in their circumstances.
As regards the good, to help a poor man changing his entire life means to attend the whole of his person. As regards the bad, the homicide is the best example of completing a bad act.
And the second case shows that is harder to be bad, at least for the reason that the completeness of a bad deed comes to become absurd, being contrary to the request of a social medium for producing moral acts.
The punishment for a person who is closer to become bad brings further such absurdity, as it frequently happened in the history of the revolts against dictators and tyrannies. No one of the sides of such an historical fact can be judged as moral or immoral, but only as outcomes of a state of irrationality.
The attendance of a state of irrationality in the personal life occurs oftener, since one’s life is not or cannot be configured on moral grounds. And it is not hard to be attended.