…in one way…a thing is affected by like, and in another by unlike; for it is the unlike which is affected, although when it has been affected is like
Aristotle, De Anima 217a20-21.
The most suitable object for exercising upon us their power of affecting would belong to what is unlike or alien to us.
The transformation from unlikeness to likeness cannot be as a total resorption of the objects that affect us into those that are affected.
‘Omoion’ (like) meant for Aristotle that two things share a common part, but do not share all properties, so that to become identical.
If we accept such analysis as regarding the formation of knowledge, then we have to question about the remaining parts after the transformation.
Do these parts constitute the rest of the knower as a possible container of other objects? Or, for the object, its parts that are apart of the process of knowledge are those that support its independent existence?
Both questions transgress the limits of epistemology for being treated in an ontological discourse.
However, we may find among the faculties supposed to contribute to the formation of knowledge, some that seem to retain from the object just those parts that do not actually affect us as much as sharing with us the attribute of likeness. And, for this reason, we may attribute to such faculties an ontological function in the minimal sense of expressing the ways we are in the nearby of other things that are.
Thus, may we classify the activity of memory as being entirely devoted to the objects we already know? If we imagine that we have a memory of a thing and only by a scrutiny of that memory we can know this thing, then we should admit that beyond the process of transformation or simply of affection, the things can arrive to us in a non-cognitive manner.
Given the independence from the relation of likeness, it is reasonable to add that the objects and their knower are both independent. Not independent for being known by other observers or for knowing other objects, but independent for being able to be closer each other than the ‘affective’ way of knowledge can do.
The movement of such independent entities for being together starts a new kind of knowledge that should be purified by every attempt of mingling the involved parts. And it is not really a ‘new’ kind of knowledge, because the feeling of being always a rest to be known persists in any act of knowledge, even in those that offer a comprehensive description of their objects. The feeling can be justified at least for the fact that the knower always remains somewhat beyond or beneath of the act of knowing.