The existence of something as a self-conscience of your moral state could be attested by outer evaluation of one’s self, since an inner recognition opposed to the usual exposed manner of attesting the existence of things.
The praise and blame represent such evaluation, being the ways by which is established one’s responsibility for his acts.
Moreover, praise and blame are expected to be heard by the one who acts, so that they seem to be required as criteria for confirming the conscience of a moral state.
In spite of such expectation, the praise or the blame instills into the moral agent the sense of being the author of a praised or blamed act or life, but does not make him to recognize his responsibility for the unqualified act or life.
Thus, the praise or the blame cannot fulfill the duty of attesting the self-conscience of one’s own moral state. The lack of an outer confirmation of the moral conscience does not neglect its existence, but rather declines its common image of a definite feeling of the authorship of moral acts or state. Without an outer confirmation, the conscience cannot obtain the clear shapes of an inner moral judgment.
Therefore, the conscience gleams hardly through the dominant belief of the moral agent, even if an unspoken one, that he only partakes to some events or is the subject of what happens in his life, without being totally responsible for his own and wanted acts or character. The self is also in lack of configuration, being associated with the acts of life through which one passes.
The conscience of your own moral state seems not to be an inner one. It includes all the outer events able to define one’s life, but also the persons or community with which he lives. And we can remind that the Ancient Greeks believed that the self of an individual was determined by his community.
The common prestige of an ‘inner moral judgment’ is caused by the usual practice of reporting ourselves to the outer evaluation of our facts and life. It occurs in fact a contradiction: what is said from outside about us is believed to be a part of our interiority. When nobody praise or blame us, we conceive our facts and life as praiseworthy or blamable by others.
The inappropriateness of such conception rises under the form of the fear that we do not belong to us whenever our acts bear a bad moral sense. While the good acts are prominently attributed to ourselves in a social context, the bad ones are believed to come from outside and still belonging to us. The guilty conscience is borne from this ambiguity of ownership of our facts or life, and less by a supposed inner process of conscience. The guilty presses upon the moral agent primarily because he finds himself in a position from which he cannot establish what is his own and what belongs to others.