vineri, 20 ianuarie 2012

Distinguishing Things


The will of distinguishing things as a self-assumed duty cannot belong to someone in isolation from others.

Such will raises after the things are already distinguished for himself in the way of containing them in the initial, confused, and undistinguished amount of things.

There is not an original confusion of things shared by anyone in the same way.

Each man has a different outlook of the initial confusion. And it is not yet a theoretical view, since it comes only when someone starts to destroy the confusion by separating the things kept inside. It is rather involved the manner by which one individual person withstands, is opposed to, or accepts the confusion. Everyone has to defend himself for not being also brought among other things that compose the confusion.

One who encounters the confusion by opposition anticipates all the things that will be distinguished. One who accepts it has already decided for not accepting the things that can be distinguished; he only looks forward for a way of finding a comfortable place into confusion.

Because of the primary anticipation, the thinker who is bent on distinguishing things executes his work partly for him and partly for others, since only the anticipative attitude belongs to himself in the most proper way.