Any sincere philosophical account of reality must descend from the high position of philosophy established by the historical tradition for justifying instead the philosophy in your own life, which it is seemingly a base duty. With greater or lesser success, some philosophers do this.
The consideration of origins in your own life follows the practice of bestowing sincerity on a discourse.
For the sincerity of discourses, there is the tedious practice of self-questioning about the purposes envisaged in a speech.
The question ‘Why do I want to say this or that?’ can be answered by pointing to the context of speech and mainly to the will of a particular audience. It is not really a self-scrutiny, but rather the investigation of the kinds of relation between the speaker and the outer context or his intended relation to others.
The sincere philosophical account would have to manage the same problem of relation. Again, it is the relation to reality and to other men.
Nobody can say that he philosophizes for the benefit of reality. The reckoned purpose of knowing the reality is still a personal ideal, far from being a relation. To say that you philosophize for others is a feeble justification, since the attention to the public expectations implies diminishment for the generality followed by any philosophical account.
The relation needed for justifying the will of philosophizing might be found in those aspects of personal existence that drag one out of anything that constitutes the certainty of his position. The question will be: ‘What makes or forces me to say this or that?’. Any determination of such ‘what’ excludes by itself the danger of subjectivity. Likewise, any menace of one’s safe existence is to be found in an event that does not belong to him, but only occurs to him. Consequently, the sincere beginning in philosophy should not be based on elementary truths, but rather on elementary uncertainties that act against the elementary surety.