The grounds of an argument cannot overleap its premises.
We may say that the grounds come from elsewhere than the language that generates the premises and the argument as a whole.
They are not in a parallel dimension to the argument, as if they were that reality that verifies it. The notion of ‘ground’ should mean something that can stay by itself, without being the expedient of the premises that need confirmation. The ground should provide to those who give arguments their firm position on which they are in right to give them.
The simple reality that confirms the premises cannot support the man who provides them.
The existence of something like the grounds of an argument is often testified in a negative way. The resistibility of an argument to any proof from reality that falsifies its premises and conclusion is often imputed to the author of an argument, supposing that he has other reasons of his position than the premises.
There is also a habit of accusing such reasons of being originated in some features belonging to an area at best to be disclosed by ad hominem arguments.
Instead, the reasons of an argument that resists to objections are signs of some grounds of the argument, which cannot cope with the expressed premises. We speak of scientific, religious, moral grounds, but all of them should prove their functionality as grounds for an argument by their force to sustain the man who issues arguments. Farther, we know that the grounds succeed in their task, as long as the arguments he offers can easily change their forms of expression. Then, we know that the grounds are confined to the argument and not to its linguistic form.
Having that force over language, the grounds cannot be discovered behind any sort of argument. Not every argument can be related to a reality that supports the man himself. Therefore, many arguments prefer to be concerned with the reality that confirms the premises; their efficiency is always conjoined with an unexplainable sense of futility.