miercuri, 1 februarie 2012

Hegel's Nature and Human Nature



Hegel, Encyclopedia’s Philosophy of Nature: ‘The goal of Nature is to destroy itself and to break through…Nature has become an other to itself in order to recognize itself as Idea and to reconcile itself with itself…Spirit, just because it is the goal of Nature’

If we adapt Hegel’s consideration to the nature of man, the common image of the raising of man to a spiritual life would be significantly changed.

A simile of Nature in man is not a definable characteristic of all humanity, but rather what seems to any individual as being him as a unity. The difference between what constitutes a man and the man as such is not really perceived by a spontaneous observation and only this kind of cognitive movement counts for explaining how man perceive himself as a certain unity.

The spontaneous self image is absent for a man, but its absence is filled by a multitude of personal features with which he is familiar. The first discussions about self arise from the use of a personal name. All that is confusing perceived as belonging to you becomes clarified by a name that can be viewed otherwise as the weakest sign of individuality.

It is not chosen only the name, but also that expectation that language can shape whatever is confused concerning us and is able to bring it to us as a definite property.

There is not a misinterpretation of the language. Language is a precise manner of dealing with things, but its preciseness often extends over the confusing things on their surface. Like the schematic representations of things, language seem to extract from them just what is necessary for other relations than those supposed by their approach. If the words would enter into the things, they could not come out for being used to different communicational purposes. To communicate needs the brevity and the simplicity that cannot be taken by a long inquiry into things.  It naturally excludes the long description of the elements that compose a confusing image as it is that of the self.

In the case of the primary self-knowledge, the language establishes the surface of individuality designated by the personal name. By this, the confusion itself remains untouched.

The untouched confusion cannot be destroyed just in the virtue of approximation of its content through language, since what is confusing cannot be involved in a definite process as destroying. Therefore, we are far from Hegel’s Nature that destroys itself for becoming Spirit.

Whereas the man conceives himself as a certain confusion saved by a name, his spiritual goal will fail. He will become spiritual by inserting into the untouched confusion a different element called spirit or by adding to the surface of his linguistic identity the spirituality that has also a linguistic nature.

Moreover, since he does not destroy himself, the man cannot renounce to his idiosyncratic perspective when he talks about spiritual matters, which are deemed to have a general meaning. All that is proper to someone in a superficial way, as the attitude of envy, resentment (as Nietzsche remarks), desire of dominating through language, etc. contaminates the supposed spiritual reflections.