vineri, 10 februarie 2012

Past Things

The inclusion of the subject into the predicate in the proposition of traditional logic suggests the tranquility proper to things of the world as they are represented in a general order of species and genera.

When the subject is included in the predicate, it leaves away all our problems in confronting the things as subjects. The things seem to escape from us by a self-movement to the predicates they belong to.

Once included in predicates, the subjects will express an eternal generic relation between the class of subjects and that of predicates.

The same dissolution in eternity occurs whenever we adopt the things of the world in their multitude. The passage from a thing to another means that the things are successively lost.

The things about which we spoke and according to which we acted cannot disappear, since they always can be recalled for explaining our present state. In fact, they are left over to interact with other lost things. It is an ordered interaction like that of the inclusion of subject into predicate, because each new thing is added to those old ones already consumed.

We might presume that they benefit from tranquility as the eternal generic relations between propositional terms. Although the past things may overrule in the present time and may produce disorder in one’s life, if they are conceived as causes of remorse and regret, they do not generate disturbance by themselves.

The only motive for which the past things seem to disturb the present state is the fact that the man interrupts his ordered passing from a thing to another. In such passage, the man is connected to the life of particular things, as it is due to an individual being. When he ceases his current relation to them, the generality interposes between him and things, infringing his natural manner of dealing with them.

Therefore, there are not past things that act over present in virtue of their individuality, but only as things that have a degree of generality. For instance, we may be impressed by the memory of our childhood, but it is both our own childhood and the childhood as such.