sâmbătă, 31 martie 2012

Divine Memory

The will of returning past facts through memory is directly opposed to the singleness of every fact of life, but also to the habit of conceiving our life as a progressive movement.

That habit has an organic nature, since the natural bent of the body is to move itself  forward, while its backward move is always caused by other thing that appears as an obstacle or as a threat.

In this case, the appeal to memory for turning the past facts back is a position that changes entirely our apprehension of ourselves as bodily beings. Therefore, the memory needs to be supported by something else than the past things which belongs to our apprehension of bodily movement.

We may remind that gods were usually spoken about as beings acting in the past. Even the emphasis of ancestors power over next generations keeps something from the idea that memory cannot be wholly human.

In the trivial contexts of using memory, there is a custom of replacing godly institutions of memory with the high power of mind or of the self as such. It is a wrong replacement, since the self or the mind never does the work of a god that generates or keeps under his providence the human bodily life and the physical world. Mind isolates itself from what is the primarily object of gods’ activity.

In Nietzsche’s style, we can impute the separate position of the mind to the spiritualistic development of Christian theology.

A more adequate use of memory for returning past facts would be that of recognizing in present facts a share that cannot be entirely comprehended, like God’s incomprehensibility.

Thus, we would not be able to return things by memory, but to use it for investigating that incomprehensibility that lays both in the past and present things, being different from all what we affirms we know, not only from our bodily existence.

joi, 29 martie 2012

Note on Abstraction

For appealing to man in the course of an abstract thought, there is no need of exposing a presumable inner life.

What belongs to man comes alone to the abstraction and does not require an investigation of human interiority.

Moreover, closer to abstraction are the elements of human bodily constitution.  Ages of artistic representations of man confirms that human body transits the concrete for being received as an abstract product of art, where abstraction means detachment from viewing the body as a thing that lays in his seemingly fundamental inner processes.

miercuri, 28 martie 2012

Knowledge and Its Opposite

Everything done at the expense of other thing gains much force than if it were be done for its own purpose.

Though knowledge can be opposed to ignorance, it does not grow at its expense, since ignorance offers nothing to be overcome. Without such competition, the knower and the ignorant easily change their positions of superiority. Almost always there is a longing for ignorance and one for wisdom.

The searching for something that can oppose to knowledge should become a parallel duty to that of acquiring knowledge. And it should be done with the same rigor.

The rigor in philosophical investigation supposes a special attention to not include into the research elements that are alien to it; the condition of expressing only justified beliefs is derived from this care for rigor.

Likely, the search for the opposite of knowledge has to eliminate all is outside to it. But outside of the searching process is what stays unmoved and unquestioned. The amount of common beliefs and prejudices is also unmoved and it is not opposed at all to the knowledge, having a proper balance and stability.

Something that opposes to knowledge and being in motion is your own resistance to advance in the knowledge of things. It is in motion because it appears as a withdrawal from the ascendant trend of knowledge. Often such withdrawal takes the form of postulating immobile conceptual frames of knowledge, which are thought of as ends of knowing account.

In this way, the knowledge confined to strict conceptual frames is one that did not identify its opposite and, therefore, it is a weak knowledge. Nonetheless, the same destructive action can be performed by what resembles to a conceptual frame, as there is the variety of subject matters that constitutes the substance of the public interest.  

marți, 27 martie 2012

Note on Thought and Memory

If we do not posit a faculty of memory as storage for memories, maybe we will know better that the facts represented by memories can move free together with the present facts.

The analysis of the role of memory in knowledge and in the use of language should be replaced by a comparison between actual things or words and their pale correspondents from one particular memory or another.

The tedious work to be done in each case seems to not be an efficient means of progressing in knowledge, although our thoughts about things and words usually raise from grasping such faded past images of them. The proposition ‘This apple is a fruit’ is not caused by ‘this apple’ and by the category of ‘fruits’, but primarily by the belief in the existence of a past apple, conceived as shadowy as it is required for discussing and thinking about it. Because no thing allows to be thought of or spoken about in plain light, but only to be perceived.

So, thought is not an illuminating process in the beginning, but the use of the capacity of dealing with shadows.

luni, 26 martie 2012

Note on Thought and Biography

The circumstances of life could not determine the way someone thinks. Only the thinker can let them to enter in his thought.

He can invite them as objects of his thought and then his thought becomes sheer description of various facts.

Or he can let his thought to grasp the things through the circular pattern of circumstances and borrowing the flowing character of life.

 In this last case, whenever a thought is judged according to the biographical records of its author, there is easily committed the confusion between the ‘mine’ of his thought and the ‘mine’ of his life.

Thought belongs to someone anytime, therefore, it can be recognized such ‘mine’, but life circumstances that are assimilated by thought loose their personal character.

duminică, 25 martie 2012

Ownership and Subjectivity

The acceptance of an objective judgment is firstly justified by its power of making someone who adheres to it free from others’ beliefs. But it is a freedom for taking the things judged into possession.

In spite of its definition as a judgment that is free from subjectivity, the objectivity represents the chance of capturing the fact objectively exposed from the possibility of being possessed by others.

The continual fading of objective things from their vivid meaning in someone’s life is the result of such possessions. An objective fact becomes of yourself as long as it can be forsaken, since the main interest in the relation humans have with the things of the world is to tame them from any possible inadvertent entrance in their lives.

The goal of human communities is also the same prevention from any unexpected actions of other individuals. Both the positive and negative actions need to respect a social order, since the history keeps the memories of the punishments applied to those who made good unexpectedly. The laws issued for instituting such order strive for objectivity and for replacing the more difficult effort of judging by yourself your relation with other individuals.

If the moral indifference produced by a legalistic perception of others is generally deemed to be an evil, then its pair in knowledge, the objectivity, should be at least cautiously embraced, since it is a possible evil done to things. The objective ownership over things should fear more than the subjectivity of judgments about those things, because subjective thoughts keep the things in the lively state of being objects of a debatable judgment.

sâmbătă, 24 martie 2012

Persistence and Space

Though in the common experience we are tempted to conceive the persistence of a thing as an indiscernible conflation between spatial and temporal conditions, the real persistent things are those that generate time.

Or, more exactly, they provoke to their observer to measure along with their spatiality his own time. Only through the knowledge of his time someone can evaluate things’ ongoing duration.

The scientific means of measuring time do not imply the knowledge of your own time, being so far from it as it is the assumption that we can intellectually be placed in a timeless order. In this case, though we can discuss about the persistent things, their persistence is missed out, being slightly substituted by a state of indeterminate lack of temporality.

Differently, the knowledge of your own time presupposes to disclose a course of life inevitably surrounded by spatial realities and, for this reason, closer to the spatiality of persistent things. We might say that persistent things are reverberated by that personal spatiality temporally revealed.

From this point of view, a persistent thing as death, which spatially conquers the human body, preserves its persistence more through the words of those who speak about it using myths inspired from their course of life than through the discourse of a physician that puts it aside among other timeless biological facts. And myths always build spaces.

vineri, 23 martie 2012

Questions in Art

As different from the tendency of driving the series of philosophical questions to the ultimate unquestionable fundaments or reasons, art supposes to restrain from such ultimate answers for the very act of being adequately approached.

To question the use of art means a wrong way of dealing with it. And to search for final answers concerning its use is a way that leads straight to its negation, being impossibly to finally detach it from a simple and useless leisure, when it is questioned about its place in the whole of the human existence.

However, art’s freedom from ultimate questions does not impede it to raise questions about those human features that it alludes at, since all that man figures out he knows unquestionably could be doubted by its appearance in a work of art. Almost like in Plato’s dialogue, our certainty that we know, for instance, what things are beautiful is doubted by the beauty of a work of art. The esthetical emotions can be interpreted as those states of puzzlement Socrates induced to his interlocutors.

Any attempt to explain art by appealing to some primary cultural or esthetical values fails to comprehend its implicit questioning. There is preferable to admit its undefinable power of addressing human existence, instead of framing it in a net of categories or values.

Likely, a philosophical discourse should be stronger if it comes out of the chains of questions purported to discover ultimate reasons. The power of philosophical ideas or questions to dissipate the large amount of certainties certificates them as being parts of a truthful philosophical account. 

marți, 20 martie 2012

Certainty and Images

The supposition that things impress images upon our mind does not validate another common supposition, which holds that the most certain things or facts leave a more vivid image than those faintly observed.

A vivid image would mean that the things are preserved in a close form as that formed at the first experience.

We should remind the most intense pressure we exercise over things in order that they will respond by impressing their images upon us. Such pressure for images shows out in our esthetic experiences. But if such experiences do not suggest or reveal more than the things artistically represented, they cannot be esthetic experiences at all.

Painted things or musical sound must impress only momentary in their original form. Afterwards, for an appropriate esthetic reception, they should have the force to rearrange the common order of facts or images composing the individual before his esthetic experience. Surely, those facts and images derive from various experiences or sources of human life, not only from other esthetic experiences. Otherwise, an esthetic experience that just overleaps old ones looses its strength as a definite experience.

Meanwhile, the certainty of the minor things in the order of our experiences provides only faded images, but they benefit of our uncritical reception because we never want to use them in a profound way as that appealed to in esthetic experiences. We accept that they do no say more than their momentary precise image can tell, because we do not want this. Nobody will be eager to be altered by common things as, for instance, the furniture of our room. Thus, attributing truth values to the sentences about such things seems a way of dismissing them from our cognizant life.

Therefore, even the connection between certainty and truth can be doubted, if there are taken into account trivial things, for which we do not pay a considerable effort for getting their images.

luni, 19 martie 2012

Things Ascending to the World

The idea that things possess as a more specific feature something as differentia than the genus they belong can be easily reversed. What makes the things to overcome their status, as it is their genus, can be counted for their specific feature, since it expresses the best of their being. Nietzsche’s logic of man overcoming man for becoming overman keeps something from this idea.

We may encourage such interpretation by renouncing to the authoritative position of some general categories as genera. Their authority is in fact deceitful, since it is shared not only by them, but also by their proponents in the effort of building a systematic view of reality.

Otherwise, the existence of general notions can be explained just through the individuals ascending to them; an ascension to the genera, not a simple subordination, as Aristotle claims against Plato’s powerful Forms.

For admitting this interpretation, we may previously confess our ignorance about genera. For instance, for the proposition ‘Socrates is an animal’, our knowledge of the animal that appears in the proposition grows as long as we know more about how Socrates attained the animality during his life.

And the involvement of human beings as subjects about which genera are predicated opens an existential approach. The non-human things, including human body, seem to require an approach that takes the form of a story about their ascending movement to a higher reality than themselves. If we eliminate the genera as key terms of analyzing things, it remains the notion of ‘world’ as an all encompassing reality, the question being: ‘How do the things ascend to the world until to be confounded with its parts?’ If the account of inanimate things cannot take the form of a story, their kinship with human body, which was already perceived by the ancient philosopher, can help to answer to the question above.

duminică, 18 martie 2012

Perfection, Self-Sufficiency

The signs of a self-sufficient reality can be seen harder than the signs of a perfect or totally achieved reality.

While an achieved reality is supposed to correspond to a unique type of reality of its genus, a self-sufficient reality has to prove its nature among the numerous realities belonging, again, to its genus.

The lack of a unique type, as it happens in the case of human beings, means that we have to do with a reality which can at most to be self-sufficient, not perfect.

The demonstration of self-sufficiency becomes a personal task for humans and it has to fight with the task of knowing their self-sufficiency, which is assumed by others in their desire of identifying persons as definite and foreseeable wholes.

And only others attempt to establish the self-sufficiency of certain persons by comparing them with other men. It results an erroneous idea of self-sufficiency, since others generally cannot concede to those persons an internal self-sufficiency. By comparing them, the self-sufficiency is conceived as only as a set of individual characteristics.

For someone who has to prove his self-sufficiency, the limitation caused by others’ comparison makes him to wish for possessing rather a kind of perfection. Therefore, the cases of strong individualities refer to individuals that seem to follow perfection, along with the egoistical belief that they are unique types of the genus or category they belong to.

sâmbătă, 17 martie 2012

Music and Marginality

Music is a marginal thing among human realities. Who could place it near reputed realities as politics, morality, or scientific knowledge?

When it grows and conquers individuals and makes some to believe that it is a primary reality, there is not lost its marginal character. That character is reflected in the descending and ascending movements of music, never met in the ever firm position of a reputed human reality.

On the contrary, music instills marginality in the core of human reality that is represented by each human being. Afterwards, such marginality is spread over all the human realities, as long as they depend on each individual consent. For instance, if morality would exclude a single man from its sphere of application, it will cease to be available as a whole.

 Music affects with marginality especially the confidence in the sound of words that express the principal human realities. In the same way, visual arts affect the powerful images those realities promote.

Aristotle and the Nature of Contradiction

Aristotle: A contradiction is an opposition which of its own nature excludes a middle (Posterior Analytics, 2)

Though the contradiction excludes a middle, its contradictory statements have the middle in their ancestry.

For stating an affirmation or a negation , it is needed a rational medium,  where the thoughts expressed are meant to be accepted by any participant to the discourse, both by those who would held the affirmation and those who would held its contradictory.

The previous medium is forgotten when occurs the contradiction. Since Aristotle presupposes the contradiction excludes a middle by its nature, the cause of oblivion seems to be the raise of an opposition that claims the existence of its own nature, one that is clearly apart from those sorts of nature engaged in the previous argumentation for one of those contradictory statements.

Until the clash of two contradictory statements, the argumentative medium generously exposes the nature of those who give reasons for their statements, because any argument is a rational structure that depends for its building on thinker’s effort to find the adequate premises. Nonetheless, the premises as statements that need to support the certainty of the conclusions must expose the evidential character of the things they allude to, so that they should be supported by precise insights into the nature of things.

Thus, once we come to a contradiction, we are forced to forget the previous natures known while we build premises, as they are parts of the middle excluded. However, for supporting farther the affirmation or its negation from the pair of contradictory statements, we return to such forgotten natures. There may be formulated other arguments using them, but, as a consequence of the former clash of statements, such natures are misrepresented in a conflictual way. Reasoner’s nature and the nature of the things he refers to are overestimated as realities more distinct than they really are.

vineri, 16 martie 2012

Discontinuous Thought

The discontinuity of one’s course of thought is more dangerous than contradiction. The discontinuity of thought is caused by meeting things and facts that do not belong to it.

While contradiction may be solved by an attentive choice of one of the contradictory statements, discontinuity requires the foundation of a new position.

The difficulty of establishing a new position becomes harder as long as any thinker is surrounded by continuities already done by language.

It is always a temptation for thought to conceal its discontinuity by assuming one or another continuity. In this case, the thought betrays not only its duty of giving birth to a beginning or a principle – the Greek arche -, but also it is subordinated to an unknown principle, since it is commonly accepted that the language has not a distinct principle. Thus, the thought betrays its cognitive interest, too.

joi, 15 martie 2012

Note on Preparation for Philosophy

If we think, as Plato did, that philosophy is a preparation for death, the preparation for philosophy is farther from death.

Far from death is the usual confidence that the matters of intellectual interest cannot force the thinker to gravely valuate his philosophical preoccupations.

And since the confidence is provided by language and the language is never preparatory for something else, the thinker forgets his state of preparation for philosophy.

Due to the inspirational force of some philosophical words, some thinkers loads their words with grave tones, while some adopt the comfortable belief that even the grave philosophy can be reduced to the shallow range of discourses used by those who forget they actually prepare themselves for philosophy. 

miercuri, 14 martie 2012

On the Cause of Errors

The main cause of errors in a domain of knowledge is currently identified with the unclear character of its objects. God in theology and metaphysic reality in philosophy are the emblematic cases.

But, judging the frequency of errors, such a cause seems to be the lack of consequences for those who make errors.

Greeks called the fact of committing errors by hamartanein, which has as a concrete meaning the fact of missing the target. From this sense, we may suppose that someone who makes an error lacks both to reach the target and to have that adequate tension for reaching it; a tension that is not caused only by the importance of the target, but also by the consequences presumably to follow after the failure. A moving target can hurt the bad marksman or the failure makes him ashamed.

As concerning the domains of knowledge, those where the errors are frequently committed are permissive regarding the consequences felt by someone who makes errors. Excepting outer consequences, as a public accusation or the blame of scientific community, nobody feels as a wrongdoer just because he makes a false statement. If we take the model of missing the target, then even the competent blame is insufficient for stopping the errors. Moreover, even the harshest admonishment is ineffective, since it does not come from the target itself and cannot make ashamed someone who has the minimal competence that validates him as a member of the scientific community that accuses him. And when the target of knowledge cannot condemn the errors by itself, this means that the entire domain of knowledge is far from being supported by its objects of knowledge. In this case, the truths do not overwhelm the errors, but only differ from them.

Thus, the dispute between the great errors and truths cannot be confined to a scientific domain or to a scientific community. A great error is consumed or consumes someone who wills to reach the target represented by an object of knowledge that evokes by itself the truth. Above any demonstration of their existence, God or metaphysical realities evokes the truth, otherwise they would never occurred in human thought.

In this way, the common accusation of the objects of knowledge for the errors produced in a certain domain is justified only by the incapacity of such a domain to be responsible for truth and error. But it is completely wrong as long as it suggests that the objects belong to some domains of knowledge.

marți, 13 martie 2012

Note on Knowledge and Competition

The competition between knowers always spreads over the things known.

Thus, Plato’s image of cave, where the prisoners are in competition for knowledge from the beginning to the end of the story, is paralleled by the hierarchical view of the supreme principle, where the Good prevails over being and knowledge.

However, the competition between men should not establish a competition in the things known, as if they were entangled in a fight for dominating each other.

Being admitted that the ever existent objects of knowledge lay always in their position,  any attempt of ordering them will attempt to identify the things that stay most firmly unmoved in their places.

Since the movement of the objects of knowledge is caused by the movement of the human competition for knowledge, the firmest things would be those that do not feed such movement.

Therefore, the reputed certainties ever invoked in human debates and also the highest moral values that support the discourses about   human reality cannot be considered as benchmarks for ordering things.

sâmbătă, 10 martie 2012

The Indeterminacy of the Images

In the common experience, the image of an object is normally grasped without strict boundaries that could isolate the thing from other objects and aspects of the reality surrounding it.

If we attempt to determine precisely which are those objects and aspects, we do not offer a comprehensive account of the primary object, but we put each of those other elements in its position as an object possessing a correspondent image and an amount of indetermination. When such an aspect is the space, there is well known that we meet along with the precise measurement a kind of indetermination even greater than that of the object, since the full understanding of space needs ultimately the representation of the objects occupying it.

For stopping an unending chain of explanations of indeterminacies proper to the things imagined, we rather have to admit their indeterminacy as something that cannot be defeated by an ongoing exercise of focusing on other objects than the first envisaged.

It is rather preferable to admit such indeterminacy as an inherent part of any imagined object, but, since the indeterminacy cannot be confined to some definite thing; it does not belong entirely to its image and to the act of grasping images. The only condition is to be compatible both to the imaged object and to the act of grasping images.  

The span of the things and human activities that could fulfill such condition for a certain imaged object is almost unlimited. Any of these shares a degree of reality from the imaged object, even if there is not that appeal to reality as an authority that confirms their existence.

Thus, many imaged objects from nature allow looking forward to some divine reality with an impressive effect that is strongly similar to the act of getting visual impressions of things.

joi, 8 martie 2012

Subjectivity and Autobiography

The philosophical fight with subjectivity is primarily the fight with our autobiographies.

Because rarely we meet definite personal points of view regarding the matters we want to discuss in an objective manner. We have instead a bundle of facts of life that resist to the austerity of an objective account of reality.

Since those facts contribute to a story of our life always yet to be written, the so called subjective points of view are sheer attempts to stop the course of facts. It is stopped in a wrong way, when it is suggested that the facts are only some extensions to our subjective opinions.

The antagonistic pair of subjectivity and objectivity makes forgotten the fact that the autobiography is the starting point of opposition. And as a farther consequence, it is also forgotten that an objective account of reality has not to prevail over subjective points of view, but over the incessant life of an autobiographical story.

The autobiography is defeated whenever an objective account of reality is able to be viewed as a rightful vocabulary for reading our lives, instead of the subjective beliefs that propose themselves as rules of living and deny the reality of facts.

miercuri, 7 martie 2012

Note on Volitional Knowledge

If the general terms can be accused for their inadequacy to concrete, particular realities, though they save any inquiry into particulars for not being diminished by the objects it investigates.

More than their systematizing role in the knowledge of particulars, they act upon the researchers of particulars, saving them from not wrongly consider that the life of a knower is limited to the little things known.

Who could be confined to his research of particulars, if he would not know that it is performed in the name of some higher realities, as it is, for instance, the value of knowledge as such?

Therefore the old philosophical problem of locating the general notions in human mind – Forms, ideas, categories, or concepts – could be solved by placing them in the realm of volitional knowledge.

While we are ready to admit that volitional acts toward feeling pleasure are originated in some bodily senses, for volitional knowledge we should take into account something as the whole of the body as its source. Because the general terms used in knowledge express a desire of the knower to be placed in its entirety on a firm position that will be unaffected by particulars.

marți, 6 martie 2012

Epicurus, Wisdom for Friendship

Of all the means which wisdom acquires to ensure happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the most important is friendship (Epicurus, Principal Doctrines, 27)

It is assumed that wisdom strives for happiness. Without investigating the Epicurean sense of happiness, we may keep the idea that the wisdom is for something else than itself.

Though there are moral theories that can prove that wisdom is primarily for itself, only by disregarding the place of wisdom in humans we can overlook its direction to something else, too.

Epicurus considers that ‘something else’ has greater amplitude – ‘the whole of life’. The wisdom succumbs to the boundaries of the individual that exercises wisdom. Even if he surrounds all of his life completely with wisdom, the limits of his position in the world and the limits of the possibility of representing only wisdom in his life leaves the wisdom in a state of incompletion.

Whereas the incomplete things reach the completion as a natural integration of those missing parts that in fact belong to them, wisdom needs completion from something different.

In order to not loose its consistency, wisdom extends its property over the things that could complete it under the form of using them as means for reaching something else than itself. All that is outside of wisdom and wisdom accepts – as music, poetry, social life etc. – is primarily viewed as means. But only some of these external values become sheer instruments, while some come in the province of wisdom for shaping its form, not only for completing it.

Epicurus’ friendship is one of those formative means. Friendship undergoes the weakness of the wisdom in the limited wise man, since friendship expresses the humanity of such limit by bringing the human beings together.

And friendship modifies Epicurean philosophy: it is a philosophical reclusion into the innermost part of man by means of the recommended pleasure. The ideal of pleasure did not oppose to other moral ideals of Greek philosophy, many also inclined to privilege pleasure as a value of life, but, more than other philosophical theories, it was a recognition that wisdom is insufficient to man and to be completed by the man himself, adding to his weak individuality other individualities.

luni, 5 martie 2012

Note on Oblivion

As in a Heraclitean formula, the oblivion plays the same important role in knowledge as awareness.

For knowing truths and believing in their force as sources of intellectual illumination, one has to forget the framework of all the steps he made to those truths. Such a framework is shaded by uncertainties, idiosyncrasies, and animosity to other searchers for the truth.

The darkness of the Platonic cave is not forgotten because of the light of the Good, but rather because of the impossibility of the released prisoner to remain aware of what preceded his access to the light. The Good could not be comprehended by the darkness of the previous inquiries.

The shortest path to oblivion is to deny yourself altogether as the agent of knowledge. The confidence in an objective point of view is partly caused by such assumed oblivion of yourself.

However, in order to keep awareness as an equal important value in knowledge, it should be spread to the knower, too. Thus, the truths that do not permit to recognize the man who reached them as a man can be contested for the lack of awareness, in spite of their objectivity. The most of scientific truths have such fate.

duminică, 4 martie 2012

The Fearful Bodily Unity

The striving for claiming the unity of human self – both as a philosophical enterprise and as an interest in constituting a strong individuality – is partly caused by the fear of not succumbing to other forms of unity that seem to be non-human.

Such non-human unity is that of the body. It causes fears because escapes from our control as seemingly a non-human unity. Though it is strange to refute the humanity of human body, we have here the implicit meaning of humanity as something placed under our control.

The body moves freely from our control especially when it allows the loss of his being on behalf of some natural process that seem to origin in a nature that is indifferent to humanity. Also, the sexuality could be understood as a loss of body’s individuality.

Thus, the body presents itself as being a kind of open unity, which is able to endure the natural losses. It is not something else than the ever affected entity and neither is a unity apart from such losses.

Though the unity of self is conceived in order to dispel the fear caused by the corruptible unity of the body, it proceeds in fact only to mitigate the feeling of fear, not to eliminate the pattern of bodily unity. Because the most compelling models of non-bodily unity – the temporal unity of the self and its placement in an intelligible or psychological realm - admit that the unity is built and preserved by raising the self above great and permanent discontinuities. Thus, the temporal unity is a perpetual resistance to the discontinuities of the intervals between temporal sequences. Likely, an intelligible self must always to be collected from the operations of thought that does not exclusively involve intelligible objects; finally, a psychological self hardly can be differentiated from the ongoing amount of facts that affect the psychic life.

As long as the self is claimed to be a unity, everything that is different from its unity is meant to be different from the self. Given the pattern of bodily unity, the claim of self’s unity is rather a postulate. It is a postulate that vindicates the fear of dissolution, since the very act of postulating is contrary to the fearful act of describing that corruptible unity of the body. 

Note on Intellectual Vow

An intellectual inquiry can rarely involve the inquirer as a whole. It would be a risky enterprise, since behind any intellectual vow lays all that is contrary to the subtle intellectual devotion and cannot be put in the solemn words of a vow.

From the minor non-intellectual activities as feeding to the grossest vices, all are put out from the area of intellectual judgment once someone claims to be dedicated to an intellectual pursuit. He could not advance in intellectual activity and at the same time to return to what was previously in him as an amount of contrary or indifferent features to intellectual activity.

Instead of waiting for a healthy laugh concerning his false devotion to higher values, an intellectual should know to make small steps out of his non-intellectual life and only to whisper his vows.

vineri, 2 martie 2012

Note on Truth and Expectation

The expectation from the objects of knowledge to become known is will to truth, but also will to dissipate the state of expectation.

The social experience of the comfort of ceasing the expectation we have regarding others determines the will to truth to become lower than the desire for grasping what is expected.

Like the finding of others suppose a less or more amount of abandoning of your individual will you expressed in your previous state of loneliness, the fulfillment of expectations regarding the objects of knowledge makes forgotten the personal will to truth.

As different from the meeting with otherness when you abandon to others, the abandon to what you expect in knowledge is still a form of remaining to yourself, but a self deprived of that individuality clearly configured in the will to truth.

Note on Philosophical Worry

Since thought hardly can be defined as different from many other forms of reflection, any feature belonging to the thinker as thinker is relevant for its understanding.

When Socrates speaks about philosopher as a stranger to the city, he decides that all the features of thought are to be disclosed in the activity of thinking.

As long as we accept that the philosopher is yet in the city, the features pertaining to such habitation can be viewed as characteristics of the thought itself. Most of these features are forms of worry about the place philosopher could occupy in the city or in the world.

It is largely recognized that thought consists in interrogations and uncertainties concerning the city and the world. So, they seem to be forms of worry. Nonetheless, they can be in fact just whimsical hesitations of the philosopher caused by his unrecognized will to dominate the city and the world. Many philosophical debates that seem to revolve the social or political order prove to be simple games, not worries, when they have as their final goal just the victory of a belief over other beliefs.

The worry about world belongs to the thought, when it allows to the world and to the city to trouble the confidence in the existence of a province of thought or the trust into an unshakable philosophical condition.