The supposition that things impress images upon our mind does not validate another common supposition, which holds that the most certain things or facts leave a more vivid image than those faintly observed.
A vivid image would mean that the things are preserved in a close form as that formed at the first experience.
We should remind the most intense pressure we exercise over things in order that they will respond by impressing their images upon us. Such pressure for images shows out in our esthetic experiences. But if such experiences do not suggest or reveal more than the things artistically represented, they cannot be esthetic experiences at all.
Painted things or musical sound must impress only momentary in their original form. Afterwards, for an appropriate esthetic reception, they should have the force to rearrange the common order of facts or images composing the individual before his esthetic experience. Surely, those facts and images derive from various experiences or sources of human life, not only from other esthetic experiences. Otherwise, an esthetic experience that just overleaps old ones looses its strength as a definite experience.
Meanwhile, the certainty of the minor things in the order of our experiences provides only faded images, but they benefit of our uncritical reception because we never want to use them in a profound way as that appealed to in esthetic experiences. We accept that they do no say more than their momentary precise image can tell, because we do not want this. Nobody will be eager to be altered by common things as, for instance, the furniture of our room. Thus, attributing truth values to the sentences about such things seems a way of dismissing them from our cognizant life.
Therefore, even the connection between certainty and truth can be doubted, if there are taken into account trivial things, for which we do not pay a considerable effort for getting their images.