luni, 19 martie 2012

Things Ascending to the World

The idea that things possess as a more specific feature something as differentia than the genus they belong can be easily reversed. What makes the things to overcome their status, as it is their genus, can be counted for their specific feature, since it expresses the best of their being. Nietzsche’s logic of man overcoming man for becoming overman keeps something from this idea.

We may encourage such interpretation by renouncing to the authoritative position of some general categories as genera. Their authority is in fact deceitful, since it is shared not only by them, but also by their proponents in the effort of building a systematic view of reality.

Otherwise, the existence of general notions can be explained just through the individuals ascending to them; an ascension to the genera, not a simple subordination, as Aristotle claims against Plato’s powerful Forms.

For admitting this interpretation, we may previously confess our ignorance about genera. For instance, for the proposition ‘Socrates is an animal’, our knowledge of the animal that appears in the proposition grows as long as we know more about how Socrates attained the animality during his life.

And the involvement of human beings as subjects about which genera are predicated opens an existential approach. The non-human things, including human body, seem to require an approach that takes the form of a story about their ascending movement to a higher reality than themselves. If we eliminate the genera as key terms of analyzing things, it remains the notion of ‘world’ as an all encompassing reality, the question being: ‘How do the things ascend to the world until to be confounded with its parts?’ If the account of inanimate things cannot take the form of a story, their kinship with human body, which was already perceived by the ancient philosopher, can help to answer to the question above.