Do we need to know the nature of God?
Leaving aside the history of debates on divine attributes, there should be admitted that they are the only means for approaching something as God’s nature.
Therefore, maybe we are in right to change the initial question into ‘Do we need to know the God’s attributes?’.
The Platonic condition of not discussing what we do not know what it is bans this question. Even if there are many cognitive needs that surpass such condition, it seems to be applicable for an object of knowledge as God, since human ignorance is incapable for providing the minimal support for founding a cognitive attitude to it.
Thus, we should cautiously restrain the second question to the epistemic procedure of attribution. Do we need it?
According to one of Spinoza’s definitions from Ethics, ‘by attribute I mean that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence’. The attribution would be the specific function of intellect facing reality as substance; in a simple interpretation, the necessity of establishing the essence of a substance can be viewed as the necessity of bringing the seeming external substance in a firm human possession.
In this case, the need of attribution is the need of knowledge as such. Again in a simple interpretation, knowledge is the need of possessing the seeming external reality.
We say that the reality is apparently external, because any epistemic account comes in a way or another to admit that a wholly external reality is unconceivable.
Consequently, the need of possessing the reality is also the need of knowing what belongs to us with the help of something different from us. Gods, ideal realities, scientific realities, trivial things, others are all suitable for the role of being something different from us. Until establishing a definite epistemic point of view, all of them are equally in right to fulfill our mentioned need. And in all of them there is something from us.