Before each decision the self returns to a state of indeterminacy that it is forgotten, though present, in man’s daily life.
Because only through decision someone knows himself as a definite agent in a world not belonging to him.
Although the action following the decision cannot determine the self otherwise than in respect of the circumstances of that particular action, its former precariousness of definite features urges someone to identify himself with his concrete representation as an agent. It is the happiness for finally finding something for rendering substantiality to the doubtful self before decision. The identification can easily be deduced from the tenacity of any voluntary act.
Moreover, the other factors of the action are neglected, as it is testified by the fact we generally speak about someone‘s actions and less about actions as such.
However, there are rarely cases when someone declares the ownership over actions and the identification of the self with them. Such prominent claim rather appears in polemical contexts, where the polemic state is the sign of the fragility of self.
Nonetheless, a thought may be taken as a decided act. And it follows all the aspects of a decision for acting, until someone comes to identify himself with it in polemical context. And it is often forgotten that thoughts have much in common with the original indeterminacy of the self than the heterogeneous actions have.