sâmbătă, 7 aprilie 2012

Truth and Its Mirror

Besides the correspondence between a true proposition and a state of things, there is also supposed something else. There is wrongly supposed that such third element is the justification of the true proposition. We could not advance to the things by a retreat in the area of proposition, to which the justification belongs, too.

Though put under the criterion of confirmation, truth is also expected to be mirrored by things that confirm it.

To mirror the truth means that things have the power to make the true proposition about them as one of their features.

Moreover, the mirroring function would be able to procure to the proposition the brightness it cannot have among words. Brightness for a proposition is its power to clarify a cognitive attitude to the word.

When world clarifies cognitive attitudes, it is free from any human constrains of a scientific cognitive apparatus. Because we know that most telling views of the world are those that escape from our rational expectations [notice the world disclosed by art].

So, the world mirrors the truth non-rationally or, more precisely, as long we know that rationality is ever expressed by language, it does this silently.

The true propositions that are meant to supply the need for something else than the simple confirmation should be able to deal with the silence of things.