sâmbătă, 30 iunie 2012


Any credo takes its power from the common belief in the force of any beginning.

Any beginning exercises force upon human beings because of the previous ignorance about the fact which begins.

It is the single innocent form of ignorance and thus the beginning does not prove guilt to anyone.

The beginning in credos primarily consists in the change suffered by their advocates. No one knows himself as an advocate, since the human life is larger than the limited function of being supporter of an idea or belief. Such large life accustoms us with the sense of being responsible for states already begun.

Constantly, we do not know what does mean a beginning for ourselves.

Moreover, since the highest beginning of the life itself is totally unknown, every beginning is believed as being a start of life.

Thus, a credo surprisingly makes us to believe that we can establish a veritable beginning of our life. It is not difficult to understand that many times a credo is defended with your own life: the renouncement to a credo is equated with the abandon of the life itself.

Still, that larger life put always the man to face various kinds of endings. The force of beginnings is diminished by the consciousness of the current endings, saliently pointed out by the phenomenon of aging.

For this reason, the non-religious credos are more liable to renouncement than the religious ones, which fight with the endings through the belief in an eternal life.

Consonantly, the non-religious credos are able to claim for them the lesser impressive status of objective beliefs, which might set them farther from an area of personal life that is affected by endings.

miercuri, 27 iunie 2012

Fighting with Wrong Arguments

When a true and valid argument proves itself weaker than a bad, but convincing one,  there could be shaken the very fundaments of argumentation. They are deemed to provide a powerful basis to the true argument and yet they are attacked by wrong arguments.

At least from a historical point of view, a fundament of a well built argument is its reliance on communication. In a minimal sense, an argument has to offer those premises that are intelligible to other persons than its author.

Is not an error of communication when an argument supported by such fundament still fails to prevail over a bad argument? Or, is not in fact futile the condition of choosing premises which could be communicated?

As an answer to the first question, we can admit that the rational way of communication is always weaker than the harmful manner of reasoning with the only goal of convincing. We may add, as many rational thinkers, it is a painful truth.

For the second question, we might answer that there is not a unique form of communication. The form used by bad and persuasive arguments is that of reaching others as fast as possible. On the other hand, the well-built arguments are meant to communicate by advancing to others’ disposal an object for which they can renounce to their former beliefs. Such object must be able to attract by itself and, therefore, the perfect candidate for this role is the truth, in spite of the bad reputation of this notion.

‘All sciences have truth as their goal’, sets Frege in ‘The Thought’. Firstly, we know about truth its function of attracting others and ourselves. The truth followed by impersonal sciences makes difficult the recognition of this elementary knowledge of truth, since it makes us to leave to others, i.e. to those other who created science, to solve the problem of finding something that attracts us and others at the same time. From this point of view, the truth of science, though well supported by arguments, is close to the persuasive communication of bad arguments which are preoccupied to touch others’ minds.

Without a personal search of the truth, our arguments have no chance to attract others. For instance, the scientific truths would not have many chances against common beliefs, if there were not scientific men able to defend their theories as personal truths.

An alternative of this dramatic defense of truths is the renouncement to use arguments that communicate through scientific concepts. It presuppose an effort of searching for words that belong too us and still could drive us out of our individuality for forming truths that attract others. The problem of building arguments will not be a simple duty of matching words generally considered as expressing rationality. The rationality will rather be the result of an effort of fighting with our resistance to abandon ourselves for the truth.

marți, 26 iunie 2012

On Gods' Creation of Identities

The memory of disappeared persons from one’s life is in a fragmentary condition. There are facts, features, or words which memory recalls, but never the remembered person as a whole.

However, when questioned about the object of his or her memories, anybody would answer that there was recalled in memory that person.

If it is the case of a living person, it seems that she is viewed as a now far master of fragments she leaved in our memory. Moreover, she is considered as dominating our memory or, more precisely, the states of consciousness when we show up our inconsistency as beings with a strong identity that live and master the present time. By remembering we divide our identity in the present time, so that our existence could be described as a coalescence of fragments.

There are many similar conditions to the state of remembering. We cannot recall our identity when is physically damaged by illness or affected by various forms of sufferance.

Without any other person that could take over our fragmentized identity, there are often invoked divine beings. Gods are deemed to establish identities to men even when their identity is in continual decaying.

miercuri, 13 iunie 2012

Note on the Beginning of Moral Feelings

 We cannot deny that moral feelings as remorse or regret follow a temporal order.

Their starting point is the wrong deed, but their temporal beginning belongs to the order of facts of life proper to the wrongdoer.

The facts of life rarely are disposed in a rational order, since they are influenced by different non-rational circumstances. Almost each human being is primarily interested in living and only secondary in ordering its life.

However, only the reason can link a feeling to its proper cause. Therefore, the life unordered by reason does not enable the moral agent to have moral feelings that rise directly from the time when the wrong deed was done, even if this would be their correct way of beginning.

If the wrongdoer claims that his moral feelings of remorse and regret derive from the wrong deed, he conceals a time of rationality inserted in his life by external causes.

In many cases, such forces are represented by others’ moral judgment or by the moral language they have spread in society and transmitted to everybody through moral education. Because such forces cannot be easily named, a convenient explanation for the direct link between the wrong deed and remorse was to consider that the divinity as a being which can ignore the temporal order of lives can also to return the past deed in the present life of the supposed penitent.