vineri, 31 august 2012

Great and Small Truths

There are great truths and small ones.

First of them belongs to the scientific views of nature. They are great for their power to cover large domains of knowledge and life.

The small truths are so because of their limited scope. Most of them belong to those particular experiences of life which are characterized as having a moral meaning. Thus, it is true that goodness improves the human behavior, but it is a truth that occurs only in the limited area of the individual life.

For it occupies only a limited space of reality, the small truths are claimed by many as if they would be greater.

Their imaginary greatness cannot be reached by extending their scope, but by mixing them with alien matters. When someone claims that the word as such is subdued to a moral order, he cannot really make the small moral truths greater, but allows to the idea of a universal order to conjoin them.

The mixing of small truths with alien ideas takes place only through language. Therefore, someone can preserve the purity of small truths only by refusing to discuss about them and by assuming them in his life. But when someone denies or does not know the great truths, the living of small truths will have to fight with the persistent feeling of smallness. Thus, the people with a humble moral life are always tempted to ground their life on the mixed truths.

Meanwhile, the defender of great truths finds himself in the position of someone who must come out from the limited scope of his life. And he does so by the use of language, too. However, since he is acquainted with those truths which are not mixed with other ideas for being great, any return to the small truths should prevent him to not search for supporting them through alien ideas, not even through those great truths.

In other words, the great scientific truths cannot teach us how to morally live, but can teach us to live morally without any useless appeal to alien ideas.

Lovers and Divine Love

Maybe the human love helps religion more than religion helps men to love each other.

In human love, the feelings and thoughts are needed to be spoken about, even if they are not fully developed or have not a precise nature.

Almost as a natural impulse, the lovers need to express by words their feelings and thoughts. Perhaps they are afraid of not loosing their love if what concerns it remains unspoken.

And nobody would say that such a natural impulse of speaking about things that are really unspeakable or even inexistent is an error.

The tolerance to lovers’ errors was taken over by religion for being absolved for its discourses about inexistent things. Its use of language is closer to that of lovers, and further to that of scientific discourse. It is not surprisingly that many believers claim to be lovers of God.

On its turn, the mystical dimension of love is meant to help the human love of not being afraid that it could finish altogether. God is presented as the ultimate guarantee for our love and the language as a means of fighting with the decay of love becomes futile. It is showed that the most precious use of language is for praying and, thus, for addressing to someone who is not a human being.

miercuri, 29 august 2012

On the Law of Love

The essence of the law is its possibility to order the ever changing circumstances of life. The men are directed by law for dealing with them in a better way, but maybe more important is the fact that the laws pull someone out of the changing circumstances.

Though the appliance of the law to those circumstances is a major duty, it is only derived from the primary position above them. Since the appliance presupposes the interpretation and justification of law according to a specific case, the feeling of obeying to the law is replaced by the rational acceptance of the interpretation of law.

By reminding such considerations in the case of the much praised Christian law of love, we should admit that the essence of law is already assumed by the love itself. The love for others is always supported by the feeling that our love is or will be above all the changing circumstances of life. We love as if we were apart from them and the love stories tell about the clashes between such personal belief and the reality of facts.

The common statement that love is blind is also a simile of the feeling of obeying to the laws in spite of the real circumstances of life.

Therefore, the sublimity of the Christian law of love is founded on an unfair claim that it orders the human love, though the human love is already shaped by the essence of law.

The Christian love is in fact appealed to whenever someone is too weak for keeping alive his love for others. Love is often overcome by the circumstances which it defies. In order to save his love, man searches not only for a place above them, but also for a place of love that is situated above his weak capacity of loving.

A divine law of love suffices his needs. However, it does not action in virtue of its essence as a law, but only as a supposed rational justification of love. It says how and why you must love others in various circumstances of life, but cannot make the men really to love.

marți, 28 august 2012

Note on the Moral Tedium

For being finally faithful to some moral values, there is no need of an authority beyond individuals.

The individuals may become faithful in virtue of the tedium of being unfaithful. Because it is hard and exhausting to fight with those moral values which are preached and claimed by everybody around you.

The tiresomeness plays the role of a moral authority.

And such tiresomeness should not be accused of frivolity, since it is an affective answer to the natural decay of body.

The decline of body does not imply a gradual loss of personality, but it makes the man to collect all the possible sources of authority in order to become stronger. It is a power acquired by a process of retiring from the outer contexts in which the personality is menaced of being affected by external causes. The tedious fight with the moral values is such a context.

The language is the bodily function which is minimally affected by the natural decay. From this reason, many can speak vigorously about their faithfulness to the moral values, though they would not keep them if they were not tired.

luni, 27 august 2012

Others' Material Remains

If someone did not leave to us any material trace after his disappearance from our life, how much we will be able to reconstitute him only through our memories?

According to the opinion that the relations between men are founded on spiritual or psychological bases, it should be easy to remember the lost ones almost as much as we could do when they were in our nearby.

In fact, their remembrance depends on our will to remember them. Their spiritual remains which are kept in our involuntary memories and in dreams cannot help us to rebuild them in that entirety of their personality which affected us before their disappearance. We need also the will to remember them. Our will becomes a unifying factor. And it is also worthy to be noticed that we are those who recreate the personality of the lost people, and not their spiritual aura left to us. They are often and easily modified according to our will.

Nonetheless, the same will is required when we have from them material traces. But such material remains refrain our will from exceeding in others’ reconstruction. The things without their possessors become useless to some extent. And that uselessness keeps us aware of the impossibility to use the lost ones in our behalf. Their things do not allow us to make from them items of our personal feelings.

If we generalize such an experience, then we should admit that the material nature plays a greater role in human interrelations than the spiritual or psychological ties. At least, the material nature provides the means for not reducing others to our own processes of mind.

On the Sets of Beliefs

It is easier to replace a belief with another than to replace what binds some beliefs together with another kind of tie.

Because the tie between beliefs is an indefinite set of complex human actions and not only the product of mind as it is the belief itself.  There are involved feelings, gestures, words, and ways of life in any set of beliefs. For instance, for the believer in a set of religious doctrines, such a set is not composed only of doctrines, but also of the multitude of acts of praying, singing, or going to the church; also, the same set is present in his social relations.

For this reason, one who wants to change the tie between someone’s beliefs might assume the harmful duty of changing his life.

Nonetheless, nobody has a single tie of beliefs. Because all the things we meet in life are tied and the man do not acquire only disparate beliefs about such things, but there are assimilated their ties, too.

In this case, it is sufficient to turn someone to another set of beliefs than that he claims loudly as a creed.

Such another set is the multitude of judgments about the life of our body. The judgments about things which are pleasant or not appear to be unified as strong as a set of religious beliefs. They encompass one’s entire life, too. And it is not surprisingly that the religions primarily fight with carnal or bodily sins.

However, just a few dare to show the bodily life as a set of beliefs able to replace the intellectual beliefs.

duminică, 26 august 2012

Loving Others or Thinking of Them

It is surprising that the Christian commend of loving your neighbor is not conjoined with the requirement of thinking of him, in spite of the power of thinking to move us to the reality we think.

The recommended care for others and the forms of charity do not equate with the act of thinking. Though these recommended acts presuppose that your neighbor is the object of your preoccupations, you are in fact responsible only for a transitory exit from your own space of preoccupations. Because you are always turn back to you by confessing that you execute what is your duty as a man devoted to God.

Differently, the act of thinking requires an irreversible moving out from yourself to the object of thought. As we know from the need of objectivity, the advancement in thinking an object should be confirmed by the impossibility of claiming that such an object can be understood or known only by us.

When we seriously think of someone, he will be gradually deprived of any feature that makes us to believe that he belongs to us. He will be revealed as a sheer human being that lives in its irreducible individuality as any other animal exemplar. And though it is simple to utter that ‘Man is an animal’, it is in fact a long process of thinking until to accept this truth, since all the men are constantly viewed by us behind a complex set of features.

 Finally, in each case, we have to know that our neighbor cannot be related to us, or to any divine realm, since he or she is an animal living only for itself. If we think insufficiently to others, they can be abandoned in the name of such a truth about their animality.

But when we think more, it can be discovered that such an animality makes us as responsive to others’ needs, as we are when we are pressed by our own natural needs. The persistent and spontaneous care for our body in need can be also applied to others. Obviously, such a spontaneous care will never lead to a moral theory.

vineri, 24 august 2012

Note on the Inner Life

When the self-knowledge is directed to an imaginary inner life, it is confessed the inability to cope with what is more proper to man and yet exterior, namely the life as such.

The life as such is that sheer flowing of moments in the open space of cosmic and social phenomena.

It is more difficult to give sense to such moments than to a supposed inner life, in spite of its volatile nature.

The attempt of giving sense to a moment of life has to fight two enemies: the limited time and the impossibility of feeling it as being into your possession. Meanwhile, the interior life confronts only the easier duty of being in agreement with the external life. It is easier, because anyone can ultimately defy the necessity of such an agreement or can subdue the exterior life to the inner one.

Any second of success is paid with many others when the man has to suppress his doubts about the choice he made for spending his moments of life in the best way possible and by making them as his own.

No one of the human forms of consolation to such a continual fight for our life could give a harmless solution. Thus, both the religion and the secular psychological advice prefer to turn the man away from his real and external life to the inner one. In this way, it is assumed the harmful preference for a life that cannot be fully in agreement with the life into the world.

The Final Question

A single final question can shake the certainty gained by answering to many other previous questions.

So, if we are put to doubt about the final target of one of our journeys, we are ready to doubt the righteousness of our previous steps made until then, though they were correct answers to some questions regarding that journey.

The final question draws its power over the preliminary questions and answers from our constant incapacity of thinking about the end of our actions.

Even if we are always confronted with many endings of actions and things, we are not really acquainted with a definitive ending. Our life and our mind can always to add something to an ended action or thought. All of them are prolonged in a way or another in virtue of our ongoing life and thought.

Therefore, since we do not possess the knowledge of a total ending, a final question meant to doubt an entire action or thought is received as one that affects all the previous ended steps. All of them are considered as borrowing their endings to such questionable final end.

It is the case of the question about the meaning of life, too. When we are forced to answer to it, we feel uncertain about all of our life, in spite of the fact that it is composed by a long series of correct answers.

When the religions speak about a divine meaning of life, it is not hard for them to make someone to believe that all his life should be set to follow such a meaning. For the end of the human life and of the world which are professed by religions overwhelm all his knowledge about endings. He easily renounces to those partial endings of his actions and thoughts, though they had created his identity and life.

miercuri, 22 august 2012

Women, Slaves, and Thoughts

The Christians were accused that they firstly attracted the weak people, by recruiting slaves and women.

Besides their reclaimed weakness, a woman and a slave of Roman Empire were persons who saw that they were put at the bottom of the social system, but also they felt that they cannot belong to such a place.

This feeling has nothing to do with weakness. It is rather a feeling that joins any human activity which does not drive to concrete material achievements. Only the material achievements put an end to human efforts and enclosed them in the things done. Otherwise, it does not exist strong spiritual structures to which we can deliver our ongoing spiritual efforts.

Our words and thoughts cannot subscribe to any classification. For instance, when they are classified by others as bad or good ones, our living mind which is able to issue infinitely many other words and thoughts will give us the feeling that such classification is wrong. In the name of the unending activity of mind, we cannot agree that a part of it can be reduced to some definite categories.

As it was the case for those ancient women and slaves, the religion does not make the man free from such a feeling. While they were pacified with the hope in a future freedom after death, the men are generally made to believe that their feeling is just a temporary one. Again after death, the men would understand that their words and thoughts were in fact able to provide them a place in a divine realm which is as concrete as a material place. Therefore, it is not surprising that great minds which produced a lot of thoughts and words became Christians, too.

marți, 21 august 2012

Depriving of Feelings

In our everyday life, we are accustomed to measure the things we meet.

They are evaluated according to spatial and temporal criteria and each of them is approached like a unity to be added to others or compared with them.

The same tendency of measuring is applied to human feelings. Everyone speaks about a past or a present love, grief, etc. and also about strong or weak feelings.

However, it is difficult to show in which sense we are justified to speak about our feelings as unities.

The vagueness of feelings comparing them with physical object does not allow us to use the spatial and temporal criteria for establishing them as unities.

In fact, the unity of a feeling is given by those others elements which provide its content. For instance, one love is one in virtue of the precise determination of the beloved person and of the specific time and space of the events developed according to the feeling of love.

In other words, it is a difficult task to evaluate love (or any other feeling) as a unity.

In spite of this fact, the practice of measuring directs the man to take hasty decisions in this respect. He just calls or understands his feelings as unities. And also he adds and compares his feelings, as if it will be clear what does it mean the unity of a feeling.

Because the imprecision persists in spite of such practices, there is easy to make someone to believe that he can be learned about the unity of his own feeling. The teachers of morality do this, without reminding to their disciples about the unity provided by the very states of fact which are involved in human feelings.

Thus, the teacher draws scales, tables, or trees of virtues and vices corresponding to our feelings and numbers them as unities. His further step is to show that the unity of a feeling is not really into our possession, but is provided by some high or divine principles. For instance, our love is figured out as a pale imitation of the divine love.

In this manner, the human beings are put to disbelieve their own feelings altogether. They doubt about the possibility of thinking of a feeling in terms of its appliance in the particular contexts of his life.

In the religious morality, the sinner is put to think that his bad feelings of pleasure come from some evil forces, whereas the virtuous man should consider that his good feelings are motivated and generated by divinity.

luni, 20 august 2012

Egoistical Conversions

The conversion is not possible in the terms of an overall change of existence according to some higher principles or divine beings.

However, many claim that their life is entirely changed by a religious adhesion and even demonstrate this throughout their life. In such cases, it can be observed that the conversion is actually done in each relevant circumstance of life. A converted man has to prove his change in any act of life, since the conversion promised to be for a life which is composed of such particular acts. He has to change his former habits of treating the similar circumstances and the solutions offered by non-religious men.

Thus, there are as much conversions as such circumstances of life.

The primary conversion does not function as a powerful source for the secondary conversions. For the circumstances that require the conversions cannot be anticipated or encapsulated into the primarily conversion which is often constituted by a sheer intellectual adhesion to some beliefs.

In the various conversions, from the primary act of conversion is kept rather the wish for changing than the content of the primary beliefs. Even when they are invoked by the converted man, they cannot act with that force they had in the beginning (usually, they appear only as justifications).

Because the life itself changes the man, the continual wish for changing betrays an intention to build another life: a life which can be easily put under our personal control. For such interest, someone is ready to deny both himself as he was in the past and others’ ways of life.

Therefore, when the religious man claims that his life is devoted to God, he really concealed a harsh egoistical view of life. 

duminică, 19 august 2012

Justifying God's Love

The purest love for others shows itself indifferent to any justification of the bad suffered by the beloved ones.

When a lover put the problem of justifying his acts for defending the beloved from various bad situations or to accept the reasons of those bad situations, he is far away from the so called purest love. He expressed his love, but with the concession of being caught in those problems of the world which do not allow being preoccupied only about the person he loves.

For instance, if he put the problem of the righteousness of his actions on behalf of the beloved ones, there is a consequence of the hidden belief that the world presents those contexts which require the analysis of his feelings in terms of righteousness or justice. If he accepts the natural character of illness and dying when his beloved is affected, it is again a consequence of his conviction that all the men are subdued to the natural order of this world.

If it is true that ‘God is love’ and also that He is essentially above this world, from where would He find justifications for the obvious cases when He lets each individual to suffer? Because all the men he is supposed to love confront at least the evil of dying.

Thus the problem is why God must justify his love and not the recurrent accusation of his bad treatment of those he loves. Otherwise, since the arguments for God’s love are advanced by men who are caught in this world, there is quite probable that they can easily find well justifications.

sâmbătă, 18 august 2012

Lying for Truths

The success of a lie in supporting one’s life is conditioned by his power to appeal to that lie in a recurrent way.

It is the cognitive power of seeing the evidences of the contrary facts to your false beliefs and still to keep them. To refuse to decline your false beliefs means to have a stronger knowledge than the obvious facts. [Perhaps the image of the believer in lies as their blind servant is wrong]

It is the knowledge of your interest in keeping the lies untouched by any contrary evidences.

When the life is supported by truths, for instance, the truths about the natural world, they must also to be used as frequently as the false beliefs.

But they cannot be used in such manner, because the individual life naturally goes away from objective certainties, since its individuality needs to be preserved by subjective points of view.

It must be added to the truths a personal interest, too.  It should be a personal interest in promoting truths and it could be stronger or weaker according to the social circumstances of life. A society which encourages lies makes such personal interest stronger.

However, the knowledge of this personal interest does not derive from the truths themselves, since it is added to them.

On the contrary, the truths would say to us that there is not the case to defend any personal interest. For instance, the natural truth that man is only a mortal animal cannot feed one’s ambitions to fight for the truth.

Thus, the personal interest for truths is less known than the liar’s one.

And many times the defender of truths appeals to lies for supporting his vaguely known interest. [For instance: the false belief that it is worthy to spend your life in claiming truths; the illusion that your labor in claiming truths would make you to enjoy an eternal renown]

Anyway, such lies are harmless, because they do not oppose to the evidences, but join them.

About the Preference for Ignorance

The dissatisfaction with the things already known is not caused only by their nature.

For instance, we can be bored by the triviality of the best known things: our place, our body, our memories, or the simplest data about the natural world.

But we are also dissatisfied with the manner by which all these things come to constitute our knowledge. They are gathered so easily, so that they seem to be simple extensions of our personality and not acquisitions of something different from us.

And only a thing totally different could give us the pleasure of knowing it, since it makes us to believe that we impose ourselves over the reality. The joy of conquering overwhelms the satisfaction of getting certainty in knowledge, as it is known from the natural world to which we belong.

When someone approaches matters totally unknown to him – as a divine reality or the eternity of life -, he imagines that his placement in the nearby of such different things from all others he actually knows makes him their conqueror.

Moreover, the great chance of being in the nearby of those things progressively diminishes the need of knowing and really conquering them. The things themselves should make him a knower and a conqueror. When a divine power is set among those things, it is expected that it will procure all we cannot afford by ourselves.

Thus, our natural inclination for conquering makes us to refuse the natural world as a sufficient object of knowledge.

vineri, 17 august 2012

Note on Thought and the Real World

When do you lose your thoughts?

Excepting the mental diseases, there are two situations: when you have other thoughts that replace the first ones; when you have more important things to do than to think.

Thus, we could infer that in order to preserve some of our thoughts, we should keep them apart from other thoughts. Secondly, we must dedicate ourselves more to thinking and less to other activities.

And both of these could be taken as exigencies for the composition of thoughts, not only for their preserving.

Both of them would move the process of thinking apart from the common pattern of used for explaining its nature: as a reflection or image of reality. Because they presuppose a kind of refuge from reality: in the sphere of other thoughts or in the activity of thinking, which is farther than the reality of other human actions.

In this case, the thought cannot be appealed to come closer to real facts for reflecting them, because it would be required to it to renounce to its own nature.

It seems preferable to investigate the manner in which the real facts reach the human mind and how the interchanges and replacements of thoughts betray the processes occurred in the world of real facts.

Because the ways we compose and preserve thoughts are intended to detach from the world, but they are finally parts of the processes occurred in the world, as it is the thinker himself.

Beliefs and Behaviors

The conscience of the belief in an eternal life has a double effect on human behavior: it might urge the man to act for getting a better place in the future life or to make the man to delay his actions, because of the presumable great amount of time in the future.

But the same effect could be produced by the conscience of a limited life, too.  We might act eagerly for not loosing our limited time. And it is also possible to delay our actions for the reason that they are ultimately useless since the human limited existence cannot substantially change the course of events.

The similarity diminishes the supposed strong difference between the behavior of religious and non-religious men. In fact, they are not different in many contexts of life. The same similarity also reveals that the human behavior does not really depend on the beliefs in the eternity or temporary nature of life.

Apart from such beliefs, there is the behavior itself. Its development can acquire to someone different motivations to act which are stronger than the above mentioned beliefs.

The beliefs in the nature of life are often replaced by the real approaches of life. There are bad and good approaches, according to our failure or success in living the particular situations in which we are involved. Again, the good and bad approaches can equally lead to any of the two beliefs concerning the nature of life.

Nonetheless, the men can felt themselves tired of approaching life. And this tiresomeness implies a strong attachment to beliefs, which are all manners to escape from the necessity of living effectively. When a man strongly defends the belief in an eternal life, we may deduce that he really disbelieves the life as such. In his active or inactive behavior, it could be discovered a discontent with the human life. Even the approach of others as brothers betrays the tiresomeness of treating them as individual persons, as it is required for a better approach of social life.

On the other side, the belief in the limited character of life cannot be as strong as its contrary belief. Because there is not presupposed any strong reality as a divine realm behind it. As a consequence, since the non-religious belief is weakly defended, it allows a better approach of life, even when it leads to an inactive behavior. It also expresses the individual’s content with his life, even when it takes the form of denying the value of life, since it does not go as far as to wish for a supposed better future life. 

miercuri, 15 august 2012

Note on the Religious Moral Norms

Any moral feeling has a short time of life. We or most of us cannot feel love, compassion, pity, generosity, and any other altruistic feeling for a long time.

Perhaps the moral rules were issued to ameliorate such a human lack in moral feelings, too. Though we loose our moral feelings, we know there are some norms which always preserve the morality.

They do not provide us those lost feelings or any feeling at all, but comfort us as regards the shame of abandoning others at once with the loss of our feelings for them. The moral rules possess that continuity we cannot approach and they falsely show that the moral feeling is not in fact a matter of loyalty to other men, but rather one of respect to abstract norms.

While the secular moral rules are debatable, the religious commandments impose themselves with a greater authority.

But do they help us more with the shame of abandoning others? It seems that they deepen our tendency of abandoning others more than secular rules do. Because they do not only replace the human temporary feelings with eternal moral laws, but also try to instill other feelings that make the first ones totally forgotten.  These other feelings are those inspired by faith, which shows that we have not ultimately a duty for human beings, but for the divinity.

marți, 14 august 2012

Sharing False Questions

Someone’s questions could seem to others as being a sort of answers about the questioner himself.

For instance, suppose the case of an unknown person who questions others about the location of a certain street. Since we have not known the questioner earlier, once he put the question he was becoming known to us as a questioner, providing us an answer about his previously unknown identity: he is someone who looks for the ‘X’ street. The question contributes to the real existence of the questioner, even if it regards an inexistent object, supposing that the ‘X’ street does not exist.

Thus, from such association with an answer about the questioner, the question seems to be answerable, even if it is not. From the same reason, we are not far to admit that the question has its legacy and belongs to us, too.

In the same way, the false questions about a moral order of the world, about the afterlife, or about the meaning of life are conceived as having their legacy and as belonging to all of us, though they are questions about things which do not exist in human life. All of this, because there are people who put such questions and, moreover, those questions shape their existence.

To deny their legacy could mean almost to deny the existence of the questioners or to consider yourself as being apart from them. Therefore, they have only a moral legacy.

When someone takes such questions on, though he does not believe in their legacy, he should always remind himself that he examines them in a moral manner, not in an epistemological sense, as if he could discover their value for human knowledge.

luni, 13 august 2012

The Wish for an Untold Life

Among other reasons, the hope in a future life is motivated by the human wish to have a life which cannot be told.

Because a told event in actual life is one which is continually diminished by words and by the explanations they provide. Nonetheless, the life which does not deserve to be told belongs to someone who has not a definite identity.

Thus, when we want to underscore a great experience of life, we often say that it cannot be told. When it is spoken about, the words which are common to other similar experiences make it a common fact. Moreover, any singular experience is explained by appealing to perennial features of personality, ones that are common to other experiences, too.

On the other side, someone who wants to make from his life a story to be told does not hope in another eternal life.  He tries to make eternal the present one.

The religious man is supported in his wish for an untold life by the religious myths and stories. It seems that the life which can be spoken is already lived in an exemplary way by gods and saints. The human beings could at most to imitate it in the present life.

From this reason, the religious life presupposes a slight personal identity; the eternal life is also conceived as a loss of a definite personal identity.

duminică, 12 august 2012

No Answers

What do we do when we do not receive an answer to one of our questions?

We repeat, abandon, forget the question, or, most bothering, we are further concerned with that question.

In each case, the worry of questioning again or the peaceful renouncement belongs to us and not to the object of our question or to the questioned person.

It is in fact a return to us from the former attempt to discover an answer from others.

The religions admit that human beings still possess questions about their life which are not answered by divinity. They hold that the puzzlement should be assumed as a state wished by the divinity we have questioned. Moreover, it is supposed that our worries or peace should be related again to the silent divinity.

All of these are contrary to the common practice of questioning. And it seems that such explanations are accepted just for the fact that the return to ourselves after we do not receive an answer is more difficult to be accepted, though it is always done even by the religious believers.

Because it is difficult to accept the loneliness, the disappointment, and the slightly egoistical character of any return to yourself.

sâmbătă, 11 august 2012

Knowing that We Have a Body and a Soul

According to some philosophers (Descartes, Spinoza, Condillac), we do not know that we have a body until we feel the affections exercised over it. It can be specified, until we have the experience of bad affections such as pain and illness. Because the favorable affections are equated in the conscience of the patient and in the common knowledge with well states as such. [Who could easily classify his love affairs in terms of bodily processes?]

The same explanation is available for the supposed knowledge of the fact we have a soul. Even the first occurrences of the term “soul” in Greek language (psyche) are in the context of two states of distress: pain and death.

In both cases, the precise knowledge is the result of some speech acts by which we signalize particular states of distress and not exactly the notions of body and soul.

Obviously, the speech acts are meant to be fitted to the understanding of the linguistic community and, therefore, they presupposed a former knowledge of the distinction between bodily and soul affection, as well as a sort of acquaintance with the use of the notions of soul and body.

When we speak loud about our pains, we expect from others some relief. But it is doubtful that the primary and imperfect knowledge of the distinction between soul and body has the same positive meaning.

In fact, such primary knowledge takes place rather in situations when the individual meets a repulsive attitude from others, even it is well intended. For instance, we are learned about body for taking care for it, as if the body would be accused for its natural condition. Likely, we are learned about soul in moral contexts, as if the soul would be something that has to obey outer principles.

As a result, the speech acts by which we express our bodily and spiritual pains involve a sense of guilty for the fact that we have a body or a soul.  Also, we are prone to expect from others not only relieves, but also to learn us further about the fact that we have such dual nature. One who could relieve the pain that makes us to know that we have a soul is supposed to know better what soul means. Though we are not explicitly learned about the notion of soul, our confessor will straighten the former knowledge of soul as something that has to follow moral and behavioral constrains. As well as the physicians amplified the knowledge of body as something for which we have to be worry.

Therefore, it is hard to believe that there is a personal knowledge of soul and body and one that can express our natural satisfaction with our physical and psychological existence.   

vineri, 10 august 2012

The Pleasure of Speaking about Imaginary Things

The primary experience of naming things gives to the child two kinds of satisfaction which last in any future use of words.

It is not only the satisfaction produced by the fact that the things confirm a known phonetic sign, but also the pleasure of finding the opportunity to use such sign. In the last case, the things are considered as confirming our wish for playing with words [for instance, when the natural beings are imaged in human forms].

If we observe the human discourses in adult life, the satisfaction felt by their authors is closer to the second kind of satisfaction.

The first takes the form of the pleasure of discovering truths and is a strong subjective satisfaction, since the effort ultimately belongs to the individual thought.

But the discourses are addressed to a community. Before the satisfaction which could be felt after a well reception of his discourse, the speaker is pleased by the opportunity of speaking. An opportunity provided both by the things he speaks about and by the meeting with other people who will listen him.

This dual source of satisfaction is often a source of confusion: we may speak as if the things only are those that give us the opportunity of playing with words, though the cause is also the audience we found. The confusion is doubled by the primary tendency of waiting for things to confirm our words.

Thus, it is possible to speak confidently about imaginary things and to believe they should confirm our speeches.

Moreover, any audience is composed by men who experienced in a way or another the things about which someone speaks; so that the speaker could imagine that he has the things in his nearby. And he imagines that to make the audience to believe in his words is the same thing as the attempt to make the things to confirm his discourse. Therefore, the pleasure of persuading others can replace that of finding truths.

joi, 9 august 2012

Making Positive and Negative Memories

The last trace of an action when it is still a present image can be considered as the cause by which its remembrance is charged with a positive or negative meaning.

 It seems that the end of an action bears the lasting meaning of what will become a memory.

For instance, if it is a competition ended with our victory, the victory will give to the action a positive meaning.

However, the experience of remembering reveals time to time different negative and positive senses of the same action which we confined to memory with a positive or negative meaning.

Such collateral remains raise especially in the case of someone who returns to a past event without being satisfied with the general habit of establishing stable values to the life events.

This return is not determined by the past and ended event, but by the present and unending condition of any living person who remembers it.

We might say that that person is better posited to the unending character of life, while those who remember the past events with their primary definite senses ignore it.

Since the definite memories belong to those who have not a clear conscience of life, it results that the memories are not preserved according to their factual end.

They are really preserved with the last trace that different persons impose upon the actual facts. And such last trace could be conceived as someone’s last attempt to retain something that he cannot really retain.

Therefore, the attempt does not involve the fact itself, but the human means of opposing to the ongoing course of life. Among them, the reason and the moral judgment play the leading role. They order the memories as positive and negative, and not the past events themselves.

We should add that both reason and moral judgment keep along with the values of memories the error of denying the ongoing experience of life.

miercuri, 8 august 2012

Divine Teacher and Human Teachings

The teacher means more than what he teaches.

The teacher is the person who reduces your sense of loneliness whenever it is felt in spite of the interrelations you might have with other men.

It is the loneliness caused by the sheer existence into the world. Any kind of ignorance leaves someone in a state in which he has no support and, therefore, he feels lonely. And any unknown fact about which we are taught is one of the parts of world; for instance, the alphabet is that part of the world consisting in the practice of writing and reading.

The teacher achieves his role of diminishing the loneliness of ignorance before the act of teaching, because when the pupil or the disciple possesses the knowledge, he ceases to be lonely. Also, he forgets that he needed a person for moving away his ignorance.

And the pupil believes in teacher without verifying his competency in teaching the unknown matters.

It’s obviously that there is not a final point of learning, or an end of the feeling of loneliness. Every time, we do not know a great amount of the parts of world. Essentially, those parts of world which are represented by our life and death remain always unknown.

For many, God is a teacher for those parts of the world. But he is needed by men especially for moving away their loneliness and not for the doctrines he is supposed to teach. And his competency of teaching them - as much as his existence - is not really verified.

Moreover, any religious doctrine is claimed without a clear conscience of their supposed divine teacher. Therefore, the harsh defenders of religious doctrines are in fact as lonely as they were before to believe in God. The persistence of such loneliness in the world is testified by the fact that the defenders of religious doctrines use them especially for constituting a community. In other words, they search for replacing the acceptance of the inevitable loneliness in the world with the fight against the loneliness among men, though they are never the same thing.

However, it is true that the social life often makes to be forgotten the loneliness in the world. Likely, the friendship between pupils or disciples diminishes the need of a teacher.

luni, 6 august 2012

My Life and My Brain

Some determinate past images are not suddenly remembered, but by advancing through a chain of intermediary steps that consist of other present and past images.

Those images have something in common with the past images they incite to reappear.

If the past images are placed in the faculty of memory or in the brain, the process of remembering would bring them out from the cache where they are possessed.

Thus, the past images would be brought in another kind of possession. From the possession as an inclusion into memory or brain to the possession as a manner of putting something belonging to you together with different things which are not fully enclosed in your conscience. [It is the difference between possessing money into your wallet and the possession of money when you lay it down in the store]

But we have not any experience of the first kind of possession concerning the past images. We know that we had possessed them somewhere in our brain or memory only when we remember them and they become weakly possessed together with those other images that recall them.

And the past images are not possessed only together with other recent images, but also with all those means of gathering them in our recent life. Or, we might say, with our life as such.

And the possession of life presents even a more diluted meaning of possession. Human lives, though personal, are mixed with others’ lives and with all the things someone interacts in the world.

Therefore, when we want to act or live according to some personal past images for expressing our individuality, we do not appeal to something belonging to us in the most intimate way. It is just a claim of refusing the actual life together with others and with the things of the world.

From this reason, all the acts and lives that are justified by past images or even traditions face the problem of reinventing the idea of possessing our own lives. Thus, there appear egoistical explanations of life as ‘my life’, but they are not anything else than rhetorical arguments, though they could pretend to be supported by that form of strong possession of past images in the brain or memory.

duminică, 5 august 2012

On Bodily Vices

For the religious morality the most common and, therefore, the most fearful sins for the community are the bodily vices as gluttony and fornication.

They seem to be correctly accused for their force of dominating the whole person.

 As a consequence of the previous accusation, they are accused for their effect to religious life: the bodily vices make the men to be indifferent to religion.

The first accusation could be understood as the fear of religion to leave the man to recognize himself as belonging to this world.

Someone who knows himself as totally belonging to this world would never be interested in another world.

In spite of the natural repugnance to the bodily vices, they yet teach the reason that the way by which we must know our totally affiliation to this world should be the simile of consumption.

Differently from the bodily vices, the thought and the life itself leave enough unconsumed parts of this world.

By indulging itself in abstraction and generality, the thought easily forgets many concrete parts of this world.

By facing the natural decay and death, the life is felt as being consumed by the world instead of consuming it.

Therefore, it is not wondrous that the religious beliefs are often supported by too abstract thoughts and appear when the men fear at most for their decaying and death.

Showing Your Morality

To show others your morality is more difficult than to be moral. And to not show it to others means to not be moral altogether, since the concealed moral life is just a way of comforting your ego.

It is difficult, because men are poorly prepared for integrating in their common life the uncommon appearance of a moral man.

The veneration of divine goodness testifies about it. The uncommon divine realm confirms that the goodness cannot really occur in the common life where there is no place for veneration.

While the effort of becoming moral is primarily a fight with yourself and, therefore, a well known territory to be conquered, the strive for showing your morality confronts the difficulty to explore the unknown of others’ various personalities.

There are few ways of avoiding such lack of knowledge. It is the insidious wish of knowing others, but it puts someone away from morality, even when it is done by reducing others to general types. It is the assumption of ignorance, but it puts someone in the comic situation of showing his morality in ridiculous ways, as children do.

Another solution is to believe that those others are not known to you, but they are known by a divine being. It would replace your lack of knowledge with its omniscience, but also it would dismiss your effort of showing your morality to others, often by dismissing the moral effort itself.

sâmbătă, 4 august 2012

Note on Goodness

The false appearance of goodness has much in common with the goodness itself.

Both of them must appear in social life, because the goodness for your own sake takes the risk of becoming only a sort of self-pride.

And both of them hide something: the false appearance of goodness a hostile attitude and the goodness the time when someone chooses between the good or bad direction of his actions.

[The goodness which is not preceded by deliberation is not a real goodness, since it is not the result of a rational process. And if the goodness would publicly expose the deliberative process, it would assume the evil of spreading doubts over the power of goodness. ]

Caught in the middle of alternatives, the goodness cannot claim a consistent hidden state from which it appears, as easily can pretend the false appearance of goodness.

And maybe the high value of goodness is just its lack of anything that could support it.

When the goodness is justified by its divine origin could be only a way of affirming that it does not derive from anything.

vineri, 3 august 2012

Friendly Lies

The friendly words have the power of transmitting something else than the words themselves do. It is the very act of transmitting as communication. Since the friendly words firstly realize the communication between persons and only afterward between their words, the communication precedes the act of being thought.

To think of human interaction means to add to it an artificial construction.

We cannot speak always with friendly words. On the contrary, the truths cannot be friendly, since there is the risk of becoming simple lies which satisfy the audience.

But the unfriendly truths should assume the fact they cannot reach the higher standards of friendly communication. Their communication has to be thought of and invented, because it does not spontaneously derive from the human closeness.

And the forms of invented communication that are most adequate to the truths are those rhetoric devices that take into account the fact that truths could be instilled into the community only with modesty, as long they are unfriendly to most of the people. Moreover, the speaker of truths should have the modesty of someone who knows that he gives to others something which is not his own property.

Meanwhile, the gross falsities or lies belong always to their author in an intimate way. He cannot hope into a friendly communication. Besides, since he is far away from truths and their due modesty, his invented forms of communication exceed themselves in egoistical accents and are guided by the wish for persuading others.

In spite of such unfriendly intentions, the released forms of communicating lies are stronger than those used for truths. They even succeed in reaching to others in an unspoken manner like the friendship does.

And, as long the friendly communication precedes the communication through words, the communicated lies are received and accepted before of being thought of.

joi, 2 august 2012

Note on the Afterlife

Who could wholeheartedly embrace the idea that his dear dead companions have really disappeared from his life?

Maybe this feeling of regret made men to believe in afterlife. Though it appears to be a case when the feelings modified the right rationality, many visions of afterlife prove an excess of rationality.

More rational than in the real life, the afterlife is set in a moral order and men, who generally have not a stable place, are put in definite places. For instance, the paradise of the good ones gives them an identity never attained by any place where living men live.

Without believing in afterlife, the memory of the dead companions wants to follow the same pattern. It is bent to emphasize the common life with the dead persons and to offer it a deeper sense than it really had. The life spent together is required to be understood through memory, though friendship and love are commonly placed above understanding.

In both cases, we might say that there are two ways of escaping from the feelings of regret. The excess of rationality stops and balances the sentimental excess. And both manners of dealing with others’ death are largely accepted in the social life.

Nonetheless, the renouncement to such rational palliatives is felt as a sort of betray of the dead companions. Perhaps, because we feel as harmful the renouncement to a social pattern of dissolution of our feelings for lost people.

miercuri, 1 august 2012

Personal Pleasures and Personal Virtues

Has the possession of moral virtues the same personal significance as pleasures?

The language testifies that one’s virtues are considered as his own properties:  his or her goodness, fidelity, mercy, etc.

But a long moral tradition (especially, the Christian moral) learns that the virtuous man should not call himself as the possessor of virtues. He should act as if he would not have such virtues as personal goods. They have to be taken merely as transitory means for acting further in others’ behalf or for obeying the moral commandments.

Such linguistic prevention contributes to the wrong use of language in moral approaches. The language is not more a vehicle for expressing a real fact, since the most vivid moral reality which is constituted by your own virtues is forbidden for being spoken.

Thus, an improper language is put to serve for founding the supposed powerful moral laws and judgments. They have a power that supersedes the normal use of language for expressing real facts. And their distance from personal feelings makes them compelling or harmful for individuals.

On the other hand, it is almost peremptory to use the language for expressing the personal feeling of pleasure. The pleasures are always personal. The formula my pleasure is used only in social contexts. Not for clarifying that my pleasure is not his or your pleasure, but whenever someone defends or fights for his right of feeling pleasure, primarily in an egoistical manner.

Therefore, the pleasure is not responsible for egoism as long it is not marked by a linguistic expression for underscoring its personal character. In fact, the personal conscience of the man who feels pleasure could make him more attentive to the problem of living together with other men than any moral behavior that fulfills linguistic norms. At least, the first kind of man knows better how his person may damage others when appeals to linguistic expressions.