luni, 6 august 2012

My Life and My Brain

Some determinate past images are not suddenly remembered, but by advancing through a chain of intermediary steps that consist of other present and past images.

Those images have something in common with the past images they incite to reappear.

If the past images are placed in the faculty of memory or in the brain, the process of remembering would bring them out from the cache where they are possessed.

Thus, the past images would be brought in another kind of possession. From the possession as an inclusion into memory or brain to the possession as a manner of putting something belonging to you together with different things which are not fully enclosed in your conscience. [It is the difference between possessing money into your wallet and the possession of money when you lay it down in the store]

But we have not any experience of the first kind of possession concerning the past images. We know that we had possessed them somewhere in our brain or memory only when we remember them and they become weakly possessed together with those other images that recall them.

And the past images are not possessed only together with other recent images, but also with all those means of gathering them in our recent life. Or, we might say, with our life as such.

And the possession of life presents even a more diluted meaning of possession. Human lives, though personal, are mixed with others’ lives and with all the things someone interacts in the world.

Therefore, when we want to act or live according to some personal past images for expressing our individuality, we do not appeal to something belonging to us in the most intimate way. It is just a claim of refusing the actual life together with others and with the things of the world.

From this reason, all the acts and lives that are justified by past images or even traditions face the problem of reinventing the idea of possessing our own lives. Thus, there appear egoistical explanations of life as ‘my life’, but they are not anything else than rhetorical arguments, though they could pretend to be supported by that form of strong possession of past images in the brain or memory.