Has the possession of moral virtues the same personal significance as pleasures?
The language testifies that one’s virtues are considered as his own properties: his or her goodness, fidelity, mercy, etc.
But a long moral tradition (especially, the Christian moral) learns that the virtuous man should not call himself as the possessor of virtues. He should act as if he would not have such virtues as personal goods. They have to be taken merely as transitory means for acting further in others’ behalf or for obeying the moral commandments.
Such linguistic prevention contributes to the wrong use of language in moral approaches. The language is not more a vehicle for expressing a real fact, since the most vivid moral reality which is constituted by your own virtues is forbidden for being spoken.
Thus, an improper language is put to serve for founding the supposed powerful moral laws and judgments. They have a power that supersedes the normal use of language for expressing real facts. And their distance from personal feelings makes them compelling or harmful for individuals.
On the other hand, it is almost peremptory to use the language for expressing the personal feeling of pleasure. The pleasures are always personal. The formula my pleasure is used only in social contexts. Not for clarifying that my pleasure is not his or your pleasure, but whenever someone defends or fights for his right of feeling pleasure, primarily in an egoistical manner.
Therefore, the pleasure is not responsible for egoism as long it is not marked by a linguistic expression for underscoring its personal character. In fact, the personal conscience of the man who feels pleasure could make him more attentive to the problem of living together with other men than any moral behavior that fulfills linguistic norms. At least, the first kind of man knows better how his person may damage others when appeals to linguistic expressions.