marți, 14 august 2012

Sharing False Questions



Someone’s questions could seem to others as being a sort of answers about the questioner himself.

For instance, suppose the case of an unknown person who questions others about the location of a certain street. Since we have not known the questioner earlier, once he put the question he was becoming known to us as a questioner, providing us an answer about his previously unknown identity: he is someone who looks for the ‘X’ street. The question contributes to the real existence of the questioner, even if it regards an inexistent object, supposing that the ‘X’ street does not exist.

Thus, from such association with an answer about the questioner, the question seems to be answerable, even if it is not. From the same reason, we are not far to admit that the question has its legacy and belongs to us, too.

In the same way, the false questions about a moral order of the world, about the afterlife, or about the meaning of life are conceived as having their legacy and as belonging to all of us, though they are questions about things which do not exist in human life. All of this, because there are people who put such questions and, moreover, those questions shape their existence.

To deny their legacy could mean almost to deny the existence of the questioners or to consider yourself as being apart from them. Therefore, they have only a moral legacy.

When someone takes such questions on, though he does not believe in their legacy, he should always remind himself that he examines them in a moral manner, not in an epistemological sense, as if he could discover their value for human knowledge.